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ABSTRACT 
The United States has spent the last 14 years engaging in combat operations in Iraq and 
Afghanistan that have aimed, in part, to rebuild two dysfunctional states. However, after 
billions of dollars in development money, thousands of soldiers’ lives lost, and over a 
decade of time, neither of these countries has achieved the desired degree of stability; 
both states remain fragile and sources of regional and global insecurity.  
This thesis investigates the role that corruption has played in undermining efforts 
to stabilize Iraq and Afghanistan by conducting a longitudinal study that begins with the 
earliest days of state formation, and concludes with U.S.-led stabilization efforts post-
September 11th. This thesis finds that, of the four types of corruption studied (crisis, 
nepotism, market, and patronage), market corruption is stabilizing in the near-term but 
becomes destabilizing over time; patronage and nepotism can be stabilizing in the short- 
and medium-terms, but ultimately create the potential for long-term destabilization; and 
crisis corruption is the most destabilizing form of corruption and rarely produces 
stability. These findings provide the U.S. government and U.S. military with an 
evaluative tool for considering different forms of corruption and their effects on 
stabilization operations in the modern world. 
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The United States has spent the last 14 years engaging in major combat operations 
in Iraq and Afghanistan that were aimed, in part, in rebuilding two dysfunctional states. 
The goal behind these massive state-building exercises has been to develop viable states 
that could provide for their populations, police their own, prevent terrorists from using 
their territory to train and plan operations, and to reduce instability in their respective 
regions. However, after billions of dollars in development money, thousands of soldiers’ 
lives lost, and over a decade of time, neither of these countries has achieved this degree 
of stability; both states remain fragile and are sources of regional and global insecurity.  
Corruption has played an important role in undermining stability operations (SO) 
in both Iraq and Afghanistan, and U.S. government officials have identified corruption as 
one of the main contributing factors of this instability. In 2009, for example, the 
commander of the war in Afghanistan, General Stanley McChrystal, stated, “Official 
corruption is as much of a threat as the insurgency to the mission of the International 
Security Assistance Force.”1 General McChrystal’s statement suggests that intervening 
powers must address corruption in order to effectively engage in SO.  
However, defining stability and corruption, as well as understanding the dynamic 
between these two factors, is a difficult undertaking. Academic research has focused 
considerable energy on economic corruption in a variety of settings, leaving other types 
of corruption under-addressed. Furthermore, despite its negative connotations, corruption 
is not always destabilizing; some forms of corruption may actually create stability, at 
least in the short run. Therefore, the connection between efforts to stabilize states and 
different forms of corruption needs to be better understood in order to manage this critical 
aspect of state reconstruction and development. 
                                                 
1 Bob Woodward, “McChrystal: More Forces or ‘Mission Failure,’” Washington Post, September 21, 2009. 
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A. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This thesis aims to help address these gaps in the literature by studying the 
connection between various types of corruption and their effects on stability within the 
state. Specifically, this thesis asks the following questions: What are the different sources 
of corruption and how do they affect intervening powers’ efforts to stabilize a state? Is all 
corruption destabilizing, or can some types of corruption be stabilizing? What are the 
short-, medium-, and long-term effects of different forms of corruption on state stability? 
To investigate these questions, this thesis uses economist Michael Johnston’s four 
broad forms of corruption: crisis (the corruption that occurs during radical shifts in 
governance and politics), nepotism (favoring relatives or close friends, usually within 
government positions), patronage (the allocation of money or influence to supporters), 
and market (the illicit sale of products or services that bypass normal means of 
conveyance). Furthermore, this thesis will draw from Chalmers Johnson’s definition of 
equilibrium to define stability as the balance between a state’s populace, government, and 
social system structure with respect to its environment; conversely, disequilibrium is the 
imbalance to varying degrees between a state’s populace, government, and social system 
structure. This thesis uses these definitions of corruption and stability to investigate 
foreign and domestic efforts to build states in Iraq and Afghanistan.  
B. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis will use a longitudinal, controlled case study comparison to investigate 
the relationship between corruption and state stability. First, it will consider three broad 
periods in the modern history of Afghanistan: Dost Mohammad Khan Shah’s reign in 
1826 to the assassination of Mohammad Nadir Khan Shah in 1933; the ascension of 
Mohammad Zahir Khan Shah’s monarchy in 1933 to the fall of Afghan President 
Mohammad Najibullah from power in 1992; and the creation of the Islamic State of 
Afghanistan in 1994 to the current U.S. occupation. These three time periods include 
instances of British, Russian, Soviet, and U.S. intervention in Afghanistan and provide an 
opportunity to analyze the effects of various forms of corruption on state stability.  
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Second, the thesis will investigate the three periods in the history of Iraq as a 
state: the era of British influence, from 1914 to 1932; the rule of the Ba’ath party from 
1968 to 2003; and the U.S. -led occupation of Iraq from 2003 to 2011. The case study 
will consider the effects of British, Ba’athist and U.S. efforts to create state stability and 
the role that corruption played in stabilizing and destabilizing the state.  
Ultimately, this methodology aims to identify the types of corruption introduced 
by foreign and domestic powers and their immediate and long-term effects on state 
stability. The overall goal of this approach is to provide the U.S. government, including 
the U.S. military, with an evaluative tool for thinking about different forms of corruption 
and their effects on stabilization operations in the modern world.  
C. FINDINGS 
This thesis finds that the four types of corruption investigated have varying effects 
throughout SO. During SO, market corruption is stabilizing in the near-term but becomes 
extremely destabilizing over time. Patronage and nepotism forms of corruption can be 
stabilizing in the short and medium-terms, but ultimately, create the potential for long-
term destabilization, especially if these networks are disrupted. Finally, crisis corruption 
is the most destabilizing form of corruption, especially after conflict operations or natural 
disasters; it hardly ever creates stability. 
These findings are of particular importance to both the U.S. government and 
military. Specifically, certain actions aimed at creating stability in the near-term, such as 
developing patronage networks or infusing a country with large amounts of development 
aid, may have positive short-term effects, but, in the long run, they introduce chronic 
instability. Therefore, the U.S. government and military should weigh carefully the 




D. CHAPTER ORGANIZATION  
The thesis proceeds as follows: Chapter II provides a review of literature relevant 
to corruption during SO. It proposes a working definition for stability, a multi-source 
definition for corruption, and an analytical framework to categorize corruption. Chapter 
III reviews Afghanistan from 1826 to 2015 and the impact of corruption on stability 
during three broad time periods. Chapter IV evaluates Iraq from 1914 to 2011, examining 
corruption’s effect on stability during the British Mandate era, Ba’athist’s rule, and after 
the U.S.-led invasion and occupation. Chapter V provides observations about the short-, 
medium-, and long-term effects of corruption on state stability.  
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II. DEFINING STABILITY AND CORRUPTION  
In order to understand how the U.S. government can better target and curtail 
corruption during SO, an understanding of both stability and corruption is required. This 
chapter aims to provide an overview of the literature on SO—with the goal of offering a 
working definition of the term and its purpose—as well as an overview of the role of the 
military during conflict and SO. This chapter also outlines the literature on corruption, 
noting in particular that a definition of corruption needs to move beyond financial 
corruption to include other critical forms, such as cronyism and patronage corruption. It 
also introduces the relationship between corruption and stability, and how both impact 
the U.S. military’s understanding and actions to counter corruption. The chapter 
concludes with the construction of a model designed to make anti-corruption efforts more 
efficient and effective for the U.S. military.  
A. STABILITY AND INSTABILITY 
The terms stability and instability are not specifically defined in academic, 
military, or governmental policy literature. In some cases, stability is used to describe an 
unspecified state of being. The 2006 National Security Strategy of the United States of 
America, for example, uses the term stable nine times and the word stability 24 times 
throughout the document, but does not offer a working definition.2 The 2010 National 
Security Strategy brings up the term stable three times and the word stability 35 times 
throughout the document but also does not define its meaning.3 For example: “We will 
continue to engage with Turkey on a broad range of mutual goals, especially with regard 
to pursuit of stability in [the] region.”4  
                                                 
2 George W. Bush, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, DC: 
The White House, 2006), http://nssarchive.us. 
3 Barak H. Obama, National Security Strategy 2010 (Washington, DC: The White House, 2010), 
http://nssarchive.us. 
4 Ibid., 42. 
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Similarly, the Quadrennial Defense Review 2014 mentions the term stable seven 
times and the word stability 16 times throughout the document.5 An example includes: 
“The United States remains committed to protecting its interests, sustaining U.S. 
leadership, and preserving global stability, security, and peace.”6 In all three examples, 
the words stability and stable are mentioned without specific definitions, assuming the 
term is universally understood. Furthermore, the terms stability and stable are not 
synonymous with peace, prosperity, security, justice, or order because these terms are 
used independently throughout the documents.  
There have been several attempts by academics to define stability or stabilization 
by focusing on outcomes or necessary variables for stabilization, but these efforts do not 
offer a theoretical definition of the term. For example, stabilization and reconstruction 
expert Robert M. Perito, along with other practitioners, suggests five core functions or 
desired objectives that a state and its population should work toward in order to be stable: 
a safe and secure environment, the rule of law, a stable democracy, a sustainable 
economy, and social well-being.7 Perito suggests that these five core functions are 
interconnected and reinforcing; each function impacts and influences the other.8  
Anthropologist and current president of Afghanistan, Ashraf Ghani, along with 
legal expert Claire Lockhart, suggests 10 functions of a stable and capable state: the 
legitimate monopoly on the means of violence, administrative control, management of 
public figures, investment in human capital, delineation of citizenship rights and duties, 
provision of infrastructure services, formation of the market, management of the state’s 
assets (including the environment, natural resources, and cultural assets), international 
relations (including entering into international contracts and public borrowing), and the 
                                                 
5 Charles T. Hagel, Quadrennial Defense Review (Washington, DC: United States Department of 
Defense, 2014), http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2014_Quadrennial_Defense_Review.pdf. 
6 Ibid., XIV. 
7 Robert Perito, ed., Guide for Participants in Peace, Stability, and Relief Operations (Washington, 
DC: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 2007). 
8 Ibid., xxxiv. 
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rule of law.9 The authors contend that weak states can measure their own capabilities 
against these 10 functions of a state to better understand which areas they need to 
improve to create de facto state security. In many ways, these 10 functions of the state are 
very similar to Perito’s five core functions.  
Another scholar, Jens Meierhenrich, describes core functions that he believes are 
necessary and sufficient to create a stable state. Specifically, he believes that a state 
should create a predictable environment that allows citizens to “buy into” the idea of the 
state.10 This is best done through two core functions: bureaucracy and, as he describes it, 
legality, which is rule of law.11 Once these functioning states are created, they can 
ultimately build “six interrelated functions: (1) encouraging predictability; (2) creating 
confidence; (3) lending credibility; (4) providing security; (5) displaying resolve; and (6) 
controlling resources.”12 
These different scholars demonstrate that there is no consensus on what a state 
should actually do in order to be deemed stable. For example, North Korea, China, and 
Cuba are considered stable, but they all have one-party political systems that are not 
democratic in nature. Charles Call, a political scientist, critiques this approach of state 
functionality by claiming that this approach to stabilization is a “Western-centered view 
of what a state should be or what state function should look like.”13 He asserts that this 
approach is based on two problematic assumptions: “first, that the Western model of 
governance is exclusively stable; second, that it will be stable for everyone.”14 These 
proposed functions or end-states fit neatly onto a checklist; however, they thinly define 
the terms stabile or stability. 
                                                 
9 Ashraf Ghani, Clare Lockhart, and Michael Carnahan, Closing the Sovereignty Gap: An Approach to 
State-Building, Working Paper 253 (London, UK: Overseas Development Institute London, 2005), 6. 
10 Jens Meierhenrich, “When States Fail: Causes and Consequences,” in Forming States after Failure, 
ed. Robert I. Rotberg (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004). 
11 Ibid., 156. 
12 Ibid. 




Finding a working definition of stability is also difficult within academic 
literature. Social theorist Jane Jacobs provides a definition of what she calls “dynamic 
stability,” in which there is “a capacity for self-correction and adaption to emerging 
problems and opportunities,” within a social or political system.15 Jacobs further 
contends that the process of stability must continue to change to cope with continuous 
problems. This definition is not useful because it infers that a populace or the state can 
correct a systemic problem of which it is a part. Additionally, this definition does not set 
limits for self-correction. In theory, therefore, a democracy could “self-correct” to an 
autocracy.  
In fact, more literature appears to define instability rather than stability. Political 
scientist Louis M. Terrell, for example, focuses on the conditions that lead to the 
breakdown of stability within a state.16 Terrell explains, “For example economic 
depression, severe social cleavages, and rapid social change are disruptive to the general 
equilibrium of society; and when institutional forms of integration are unable to cope 
with these stress situations, dislocations appear.”17 Terrell’s analysis concludes that the 
state’s political system has the capacity to “receive and resolve the conflicting demands 
placed upon it,” thus restoring equilibrium, which may be similar to stability.18 This 
approach, however, is also problematic in that an understanding of what is wrong or 
unstable is required in order to discern what is correct or stable. Nevertheless, Terrell’s 
work now allows us to conceptualize the term stability better by visualizing the state and 
its society as a general equilibrium that is calculable instead of as a form of state 
functionality. 
Perhaps somewhat similarly, political scientist Chalmers Johnson describes 
homeostatic equilibrium as a condition in which a social system, its shared legitimate 
                                                 
15 Jane Jacobs, The Nature of Economies (New York: Free Press, 2000) as cited in Richard P. Gildrie, 
Stability Operations and State-Building: Continuities and Contingencies (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies 
Institute, U.S. Army War College, October 2008), 5. 
16 Louis M. Terrell, “Societal Stress, Political Instability, and Levels of Military Effort,” The Journal 




value structure, norms, and division of labor, is in balance or synchronization with 
respect to its environment.19 Johnson’s homeostatic equilibrium is the closest working 
definition of what a state looks like when it is described as stable. It is important to note 
that Johnson argues that small changes can be made to the social system structure, and 
the structure will still stay in equilibrium over time; however, when these changes exceed 
the system’s capacity of values and norms, the result is a disequilibrated social system.20  
Johnson explains that sometimes, as social systems move out of equilibrium, 
changes occur and a new equilibrium is established.21 The in-between periods would 
constitute instability. It is only when a combination of internal (from within the state) and 
external factors (from outside the state) are so great that stability cannot be restored, that 
absolute instability takes place. Essentially, the balance is no longer stabilized at zero and 
the torque of the conditions prevents the balance from returning to zero until an 
appropriate counter force can be applied. Too many changes and the state loses its 
stability and moves toward “the propensity of a government collapse.”22 If government 
sectors are not functioning, or their functions are impeded, a government is more prone to 
act erratically or in an unpredictable manner.  
An example of Johnson’s understanding of equilibrium can be found in recent 
events in the United States. Ferguson, Missouri experienced a series of unstable events in 
2014 that made national headlines, but the city was brought under control and 
equilibrium was restored.23 This is a good example of how stability fluctuates after 
chaotic events. The interactions between local and state government officials, law 
enforcement, and protesters created a new set of issues that changed the social structure 
of the environment not just for Ferguson, Missouri, but for the United States as a nation. 
A national debate ensued over race relations, the relationship between the community and 
                                                 
19 Chalmers A. Johnson, Revolutionary Change, 2nd ed. (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 
1982), 56–60. 
20 Ibid., 55–59. 
21 Ibid., 62. 
22 Alberto Alesina et al., “Political Instability and Economic Growth,” Journal of Economic Growth 1, 
no. 2 (1996): 3. 
23 “What Happened in Ferguson?,” New York Times, November 14, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com. 
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law enforcement, and the rise of military tactics and tools being used by local law 
enforcement agencies.24 These debates will move the fulcrum of social structure and a 
new equilibrium will be created. 
Johnson’s definition of stability leaves considerable leeway for equilibrium to 
sway with episodes of instability between the populace and its government, but yet still 
allows for stability over time. One example is the 1992 riots in Los Angeles, also known 
as the “Rodney King Riots.” The riots occurred after police were tried and acquitted of 
police brutality, which was caught on video, against an African American, Rodney King. 
Although this was considered a significant riot for the United States (close to 60 people 
died, over 6,000 arrests, and 3,767 buildings burned) the United States did not 
fundamentally shift its equilibrium as a stable state.25  
By contrast, the Civil Rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s had an enormous 
impact on the social system within the United States, and that impact is still felt today. 
The fulcrum of equilibrium was extensively moved over time through small and large 
bouts of instability and change. In some cases, citizens pressured the government to 
change, and, in other cases, government policy changes caused citizens to react, changing 
the equilibrium. Some of the major policy changes included Brown versus the Board of 
Education, which legally ended public school segregation; the Civil Rights Act of 1957 
and the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which legally abolished Jim Crowe Laws; and the 
Voting Rights Act of 1965, which legally ended voting discrimination acts against 
African Americans. These Supreme Court decisions and congressional policies led to 
further civil rights legislation within the United States that focused on women, the 
disabled, Native Americans, and other minority groups. Some of these outcomes include 
the Equal Rights Amendment of 1972, which made pay discrimination and hiring based 
                                                 
24 Alexandre Jaffe, “Obama, Holder, Congressional Black Caucus Address Ferguson,” CNN Politics, 
December 1, 2014, http://www.cnn.com/2014/12/01/politics/obama-ferguson-police-meetings/index.html. 
25 For deaths, see “After The Riots; Of 58 Riot Deaths, 50 Have Been Ruled Homicides,” New York 
Times, May 17, 1992, sec. U.S., http://www.nytimes.com/1992/05/17/us/after-the-riots-of-58-riot-deaths-
50-have-been-ruled-homicides.html. For property damage, see Robert Reinhold, “Riot in Los Angeles: The 




on gender illegal; Roe vs. Wade of 1972, which legalized abortion; the Civil Rights of 
Institutionalized Persons Act of 1980, which guaranteed the rights of persons under the 
care of state and local institutions; and the Americans with Disability Act of 1990. 
Although at times the process appeared tumultuous, stability was restored and a new 
equilibrium was created.  
For the purposes of this thesis, Johnson’s explanation of homeostatic equilibrium 
is used to more accurately define stability as a condition of homeostatic equilibrium in 
which the state’s populace, government, and social structure—specifically, the social 
structure’s shared legitimate values, norms, and division of labor—are in balance or 
synchronization with respect to its regional environment, or the international system that 
continually influences and is influenced by forces within the system. A measurement of 
stability is regarded as a functioning state that is in homeostatic equilibrium, and absolute 
instability will be regarded as a failed state that is in disequilibrium, as shown in Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1.  A Representation of State Equilibrium26 
                                                 
26 Johnson, Revolutionary Change, 56–60. 
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The U.S. military offers a more specific description of stability and the role that 
the U.S. military should play in SO, but these descriptions also have important 
shortcomings. The military description of stability focuses on two key components: the 
absence of violence and state functionality. Both of these components are symptoms of 
stability, but they do not offer a comprehensive picture of what state stability is. In 2006, 
in the midst of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Department of Defense (DOD) 
issued Department of Defense Directive 3000.5: Stability Operations that elevated SO to 
the same level of priority as combat operations. The directive states, “stability operations 
are a core U.S. military mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to 
conduct with proficiency equivalent to combat operations.”27 The DOD’s Quadrennial 
Defense Review 2014 emphasizes the importance of SO by stating, “In a fiscally 
constrained environment, the future U.S. Army will need to be capable of conducting 
prompt and sustained land combat as part of large-scale, multi-phase joint and 
multilateral operations, including post-conflict stability operations that transform 
battlefield victories into enduring security and prosperity.”28  
The U.S. military’s role in SO is further delineated in Joint Publication 3-07: 
Stability Operations (JP 3-07), which is the United States Armed Forces’ doctrinal 
publication for providing authoritative guidance on joint SO in support of U.S. 
government agencies, intergovernmental organizations (IGO), and foreign 
governments.29 JP 3-07 defines SO as “various military missions, tasks, and activities 
conducted outside the [United States] in coordination with other instruments of national 
power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential 
governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief” 
in which “the primary military contribution…is to protect and defend the population.”30 
                                                 
27 Michele Flournoy, Department of Defense Directive 3000.05 (DODI 3000.05) (Washington, DC: 
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, September 16, 2009), 2. 
28 Charles T. Hagel, Quadrennial Defense Review (Washington, DC: United States Department of 
Defense, 2014), 29, http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2014_Quadrennial_Defense_Review.pdf. 
29 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Stability Operations (Joint Publication 3-07) (Washington, DC: Government 
Printing Office, 2011). 
30 Ibid., I-2. 
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Alongside JP 3-07, the U.S. Army developed Field Manual 3-07: Stability (FM 3-
07)31 and the U.S. Marine Corps developed Marine Corps Interim Publication 3-33.02: 
Maritime Stability Operations (MCIP 3-33.02) with the aim of further delineating the 
U.S. military’s role in SO.32 These doctrinal manuals explain SO as a means to 
deescalate issues between the government and the populace to an acceptable level, while 
protecting the populace’s interests. FM 3-07 and MCIP 3-33.02 reassert the primary 
objectives of SO described in JP 3-07 as protecting and defending the population, 
providing “essential governmental services, infrastructure reconstruction,” and 
establishing an acceptable level of security and governance for the populace.33 The 
manuals further assert that SO can follow conflict or natural disasters, and include foreign 
humanitarian assistance, theatre security cooperation programs, counterinsurgency 
operations, peace operations, and sustained combat operation augmentation. 
Both JP 3-07 and FM 3-07 describe factors (see Table 1) that add to the stability 
of a state. JP 3-07 provides three elements of a stable state, which are human security, 
economic and infrastructure development, governance, and the rule of law,34 and FM 3-
07’s five desired outcomes for a stable state are a safe and secure environment, good 







                                                 
31 United States Army, Stability (Field Manual 3-07) (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 
2014). 
32 Department of the Navy, Maritime Stability Operations (Marine Corps Interim Publication 3–
33.02) (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2012). 
33 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Stability Operations (Joint Publication 3-07), I-2. Department of the Navy, 
Maritime Stability Operations (Marine Corps Interim Publication 3-33.02), I-4. 
34 Ibid., I-3. 
35 United States Army, Stability (Field Manual 3–07), I-10. 
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Table 1.   Definitions for Desired Outcomes 
Rule of Law 
(FM 3-07, 1–2) 
“All persons, institutions, and entities—public and 
 private, including the state itself—are accountable to 
laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced, 
independently adjudicated, and consistent with 
international human rights principles.”36  
Safe and Secure Environment 
(USIP, 6–38) 
“An environment in which the population has the 
freedom to pursue daily activities without fear of 




“The mechanism through which the basic human needs 
of the population are largely met, respect for minority 
rights is assured, conflicts are managed peacefully 
through inclusive political processes, and competition 
for power occurs nonviolently.”38  
Social Well-Being 
(USIP, 10–162) 
“Basic human needs are met and people are able to 
coexist peacefully in communities with opportunities for 
advancement.”39  
Sustainable Economy 
(JP 3-07, III–27) 
“A market based macroeconomic stability, control over 
the illicit economy and economic-based threats to the 
peace, development of a market economy, and 
employment generation.”40  
 
Furthermore, SO require a coordinated effort by multiple agencies within the U.S. 
government, and are not entirely the U.S. military’s domain. To further this goal, 
President Bush established the U.S. Department of State (DOS) Office of the Coordinator 
for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) in 2004 to lead U.S. government efforts at 
SO.41 This organization, absorbed into the State Department’s Bureau of Conflict and 
Development (USAID), plays a large role in SO in conjunction with USAID’s 
                                                 
36 United States Army, Stability (Field Manual 3-07), 1–2. 
37 United States Institute of Peace and United States Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, 
Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction (Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 
2009), 6–38. 
38 Ibid., 8–98. 
39 Ibid., 10–162. 
40 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Stability Operations (Joint Publication 3-07), III-27.  
41 John C. Buss, “The State Department Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization and Its Interaction 
with the Department of Defense,” Center for Strategic Leadership: U.S. Army War College 09–05, 2005, 
http://www.dtic.mil/get-tr-doc/pdf?AD=ADA436010. 
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development mission. Together with the DOD, these agencies along with other non-
government agencies (NGOs) and U.S. government agencies, provide a whole-of-
government approach to restoring stability to post-conflict states. 
To help further direct U.S. efforts at SO, the DOS created an evolving document 
beginning in April 2005 built on the Joint CSIS/AUSA Post-Conflict Reconstruction 
(PCR) Task Framework.42 The document asserts that a stable state should have elements 
of security, governance and participation, humanitarian assistance and social well-being, 
economic stabilization and infrastructure, and justice and reconciliation.43 These five 
sectors are similar to JP 3-07’s three elements of a stable state and FM 3-07’s five desired 
outcomes for a stable state. Although these descriptions of a stable state are similar, for 
the purposes of this thesis, FM 3-07’s five desired outcomes of a stable state will be used 
because they are differentiated into focus areas of stabilization similar to the different 
areas influenced by corruption, meeting the needs of this thesis.  
B. CORRUPTION 
The U.S. military constantly encounters corruption as part of its deployments 
overseas. For example, in the authors’ personal experiences during Operation Iraqi 
Freedom, Iraqi military officers advanced in rank or position by bribing their superiors or 
exploiting familial ties. Politically, elections experts have called the most recent round of 
elections in Afghanistan corrupt, with each side engaging in ballot box stuffing.44 
Economically, millions of dollars have gone missing in both Iraq and Afghanistan, most 
likely ending up in private bank accounts overseas.45 Although not specifically directed 
during SO, a 2013 NATO Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Center (JALLC) report 
                                                 
42 Robert Cameron Orr, Winning the Peace: An American Strategy for Post-Conflict Reconstruction, 
vol. 26 (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic & International Studies, 2004). 
43 U.S. Department of State, “Post Conflict Reconstruction Essentials Tasks Matrix,” Archive, 
accessed November 23, 2014, http://2001-2009.state.gov/s/crs/rls/52959.htm. 
44 Jason Straziuso, “A New Warning of Unrest Amid Afghan Vote Dispute,” ABC News, September 6, 
2014. 
45 David Pallister, “How the U.S. Sent $12bn in Cash to Iraq. And Watched it Vanish,” Guardian, 
February 7, 2007; Perry Chiaramonte, “War on Waste: Pentagon Auditor Spotlights U.S. Billions Blown in 
Afghanistan,” Fox News, July 28, 2014. 
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stated that, for Afghanistan, counter and anti-corruption efforts should have been 
identified as an implied task.46 
Military doctrine directly states that countering corruption should be a planning 
consideration. Throughout JP 3-07, corruption is identified as a problem that undermines 
a legitimate government, and support to anti-corruption efforts should be considered, 
even to the extent of forming an anti-corruption task force.47 However, “the strongest 
military contribution…is the example set by [commanders] at all levels.”48  
Despite the doctrinal emphasis on countering corruption, there is little consensus 
on its definition. For example, JP 3-07 states that “there is no absolute test of corruption; 
practices that are acceptable in some societies are considered corrupt in others.”49 Rather 
than define corruption broadly, JP 3-07 delineates its two forms, grand and petty 
corruption, and it is recommended that the military only address petty corruption when it 
“exceeds what is acceptable within local norms, or impinges on the security and well-
being of the population.”50 This guidance may be due to the fact that DOS maintains 
primary interaction with the high level state leadership; therefore, its focus is more 
strategic than tactical or operational. Nevertheless, the concept of diminishing corruption 
by reducing the opportunity for corrupt acts that usually accompanies conflict and U.S. 
intervention is not addressed in these key documents.  
Furthermore, despite the doctrinal acknowledgement on corruption, military 
planning regarding counter corruption is usually ad hoc during a campaign, and typically 
enacted only after the harmful effects of corruption have become sufficiently disruptive 
to U.S. operations and strategy. This may be partly due to a misconception of what is 
meant by corruption; therefore, a review of literature on corruption and its various 
meanings is required.  
                                                 
46 Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre and North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Counter- and 
Anti-Corruption, June 27, 2013, 8. 
47 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Stability Operations (Joint Publication 3-07), III-17. 
48 Ibid., III-51. 
49 Ibid., III-50. 
50 Ibid., III-51. 
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Multiple definitions of corruption exist in academia and policy circles. One 
definition of corruption is proposed by economists Banerjee, Mullainatham, and Hanna, 
who define corruption as “the breaking of a rule by a bureaucrat (or an elected official) 
for private gain.”51 This definition asserts that any intentional act by a government 
official for private gain is corruption. This definition demonstrates the “hard line” 
approach that most Western societies utilize. Little consideration is given to the context 
of the situation, such as varying cultural norms.  
Contrastingly, not all scholars agree that there is one universal description of 
corruption. Aled Williams, a political scientist, provides a much broader definition that 
corruption is “where societal norms about fairness, equity, reasonableness, and the 
allocation of responsibilities, are considered to have been abused.”52 This definition 
infers that the acceptance and understanding of corruption varies according to societal 
norms and values, which will differ by state and region. This observation is important 
because, during SO, the U.S. military must work to enforce the host nation’s laws, as well 
as international laws in differentiating what constitutes corruption. Beth Asch, a senior 
economist at the RAND Corporation, argues that institutions govern individual behavior 
and are composed of the “rules of society as they structure incentives.”53 The cultural 
nuances of corruption provide a cornerstone explanation for why countering corruption is 
so problematic.  
Another critical consideration is the role that culture and context play in defining 
corruption. Corruption is prevalent in all societies, but it is not always recognized, nor is 
it always the same act. For example, in the United States, it is culturally accepted, and 
expected, to tip a waiter or waitress in a restaurant. Many other cultures consider tipping 
to be a form of low-level corruption, a bribe that pays for better service. Also, campaign 
financing is widely accepted in the United States. Businesses and affluent individuals 
                                                 
51 Abhijit Banerjee, Sendhil Mullainathan, and Rema Hanna, Corruption (Cambridge, MA: National 
Bureau of Economic Research, 2012), 6. 
52 Aled Williams, “Using Corruption Risk Assessment for REDD+: An Introduction for Practitioners,” 
U4 Issue, no. 1 (January, 2014), 1. 
53 Beth J. Asch, Nicholas Burger, and Mary M. Fu, Mitigating Corruption in Government Security 
Forces: The Role of Institutions, Incentives, and Personnel Management in Mexico (Santa Monica, CA: 
RAND, 2011), 6. 
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finance the campaigns of candidates they expect will represent their interests in the 
government. In other cultures this could be inferred as a form of corruption. In England, 
the monarchy passes the crown to heirs within the royal family, which could be 
considered a form of nepotistic corruption, particularly in modern democracies. All these 
examples of what could be considered corruption are widely accepted within their 
respective cultures, but can be viewed as unacceptable in other cultures.  
Furthermore, in addition to understanding more broadly what corruption is, it is 
also important to understand different types of corruption. The prevailing definition 
delineates corruption as either grand or petty corruption. Grand corruption “refers to 
practices pervading the highest levels of government, leading to an erosion of confidence 
in the rule of law.”54 Petty corruption “involves the exchange of small amounts of money 
or the granting of minor favors by those seeking preferential treatment.”55 This latter 
definition can be deceiving for several reasons. There is no concrete distinction between 
grand and petty corruption, leaving significant room for interpretation, or allowing one to 
view an act of corruption as both petty and grand simultaneously. Also, the term “petty” 
may be inherently misleading. The World Bank, for example, states that “the sums 
involved in grand corruption may make newspaper headlines around the world, but the 
aggregate costs of petty corruption, in terms of both money and economic distortions, 
may be as great if not greater.”56  
Michael Johnston, a professor of political science, states that “many proposed 
distinctions among types of corruption…refer more to the location of corrupt processes 
than to their internal dynamics,”57 meaning that corruption is labeled by the level within 
the government at which it manifests (grand and petty), rather than diagnosing the causes. 
                                                 
54 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Stability Operations (Joint Publication 3-07), III-50.  
55 Ibid. 
56 World Bank, “Helping Countries Combat Corruption: The Role of the World Bank,” 10, September 
1997, http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/anticorrupt/corruptn/corrptn.pdf.  
57 Michael Johnston, “The Political Consequences of Corruption: A Reassessment,” Comparative 
Politics 18, no. 4 (July 1986): 461. 
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Boucher, Durch, Midyette, Rose and Terry assert that “fighting corruption…requires 
rooting out both petty and grand corruption.”58 
An alternate model by Michael Johnston divides corruption into four 
subcategories based on causation: market, patronage, nepotism, and crisis.59 Market 
corruption refers to regularly occurring corruption that provides goods or services to the 
populace similar to the black market. Market corruption implies a supply-and-demand 
relationship that may enable other types of corrupt acts, such as bribery. Patronage 
corruption, similar to a quid pro quo relationship, indicates favoring a supporter or group 
of supporters with benefits like providing favorable provinces with construction projects. 
Nepotistic corruption describes the favoritism of family members, relatives or close 
friends by a government official, for example awarding a multimillion dollar 
reconstruction contract to a brother. Crisis corruption refers to an uncommon situation, to 
include conflict or natural disasters, where normal governance is decreased allowing for 
large transactions, like the potential sale of an Ebola vaccination to a country 
experiencing an outbreak prior to widespread distribution of the product.  
By differentiating the type of corruption by cause, the U.S. military may be able 
to focus anti-corruption efforts yielding better results. Furthermore, market and patronage 
corruption are predominately stabilizing while nepotistic and crisis corruption are 
predominately destabilizing.60 Johnston goes on to clarify that, in the right context, all 
forms of corruption can be stabilizing for a finite amount of time. Johnston’s observation 
suggests that SO should only focus on destabilizing corruption. Additionally, Johnston’s 
definition has the potential to provide the U.S. military with a method to proactively 
target corruption, whereas current anti-corruption efforts take a predominately reactive 
approach.  
                                                 
58 Alix J. Boucher, William J. Durch, Margaret Midyette, Sarah Rose, and Jason Terry, “Mapping and 
Fighting Corruption in War-Torn States,” Stimson Center Report No. 61, March 2007, 2. 
59 Johnston, “The Political Consequences of Corruption: A Reassessment,” 466–474; Philippe le 
Billon, “Buying Peace or Fuelling War: The Role of Corruption in Armed Conflicts,” Journal of 
International Development 15, no. 4 (2003), 414–415, further describes each type of corruption presented 
by Michael Johnston.  
60 Johnston, “The Political Consequences of Corruption: A Reassessment,” 466–474.  
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For a definition of corruption, this thesis will use Williams’ broader definition 
“where societal norms about fairness, equity, reasonableness, and the allocation of 
responsibilities, are considered to have been abused.” This definition is useful because it 
does not describe corruption as grand or petty; rather it differentiates a corrupt act as one 
that contradicts established and accepted norms for self-interest. Williams’ definition of 
corruption is then superimposed on Johnston’s model to determine the severity of the 
corrupt act and potential for instability. In this manner, one first takes into account the 
law, influenced by local culture, in which the act took place, and then determines if the 
act was contradictory to the state and societal norms.  
1. U.S. Efforts to Fight Corruption in SO 
Although multiple U.S. agencies counter and prosecute corruption globally, much 
of their efforts are broadly focused on bribery and criminal accounting practices of U.S. 
citizens and public companies trading with foreign actors.61 Some of the prominent U. S. 
government agencies that work together on anticorruption effort are the United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID), DOS, Department of Commerce 
(DOC), the Department of Justice (DOJ), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). These interagency partners, along with select 
NGOs, such as Transparency International and Open Society Institute, help fight and 
bring attention to corruption abroad. U.S. policy does not address an element of state 
power in anti-corruption efforts, the military. 
Literature and policy suggest that interagency coordination and cooperation is 
paramount to making headway in anti-corruption efforts. In 2013, for example, the 
commander of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) reported that “ISAF 
will continue to need the assistance of the broader [international community] to achieve 
substantive counter-corruption reforms.” 62 In cases where the military is deployed to 
provide stability within a foreign country, military commanders may be the only U.S. 
                                                 
61 “A Resource Guide to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act,” 2, November 14, 2014, http://www. 
sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1365171485784#.U_pt0WOGNaE.  
62 Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre (JALLC) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO), Counter- and Anti-Corruption, June 27, 2013, 11. 
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asset in the geographical area that can report and directly affect corrupt practices. 
However, the very presence of U.S. military units may be directly or indirectly 
responsible for encouraging corrupt practices of host nation actors because of the U.S. 
ability to inject funds into a state’s economic system and to affect civic power dynamics. 
These are issues that need to be addressed in a comprehensive DOD policy for countering 
corruption in SO.  
Military anti-corruption efforts have received more emphasis following 
Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. The U.S. military utilizes the most 
stringent definition for corruption, yet, pre-deployment corruption training states that it is 
a “Western definition, but sustained success will be in the way Afghans view things.”63 
As mentioned, corruption, according to the military definition is typed by either grand or 
petty. However, using Johnston’s method of categorizing types of corruption into 
stabilizing and destabilizing is more functional for the U.S. military since their primary 
concerns are security and stability. Again, corruption can be stabilizing or destabilizing 
within specific contexts, such as time period or the culture. Categorizing corruption by 
causation also aids both with prioritization and in creating operational and tactical 
guidance for the military’s anti-corruption efforts.  
Despite the U.S. military’s recognition of the need to fight corruption during SO, 
implementing an anti-corruption strategy is difficult. Aside from developing a broad 
definition of the phenomenon, the primary challenge is to detect acts of corruption or 
discover the corrupt individual, a problem encountered by all anti-corruption efforts.64 
The second specific challenge for the military is determining whether mission success 
requires the cooperation of a corrupt individual. In some instances, a corrupt individual is 
vital to U.S. military efforts, such as the U.S. partnership with Afghan warlords at the 
beginning of Operation Enduring Freedom. In these circumstances, determining when 
and how to fight corruption, as well as preventing it, becomes increasingly difficult. 
                                                 
63 Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, Governance, Legitimacy and Corruption in 
Afghanistan, (predeployment PowerPoint presentation), 7, https://atn.army.mil/dsp_template.aspx? 
dpID=143. 
64 Benjamin A. Olken, Corruption Perceptions vs. Corruption Reality (Cambridge, MA: National 
Bureau of Economic Research, 2006), 1. 
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Third, military commanders and staff must forecast the type of corruption that endangers 
the military’s mission and focus efforts against these specific acts or individuals. These 
points are suggested in General McChrystal’s 2010 anti-corruption guidance for 
Afghanistan, which identifies three types of corruption (extortion, nepotism, and 
patronage) across five governmental organizations (the police force, border security, 
public officials, judges, and contractors).65  
Despite providing methods to cope with corruption, conflicting prioritizations for 
counter corruption efforts exist within the directive.66 For example, initial guidance 
targets all corrupt actions, but the plan of action only specifies procedures for reporting 
corrupt public officials, insinuating that subordinate units should focus on public 
officials. JALLC posits that successes within the military can translate into non-military 
areas.67 So by focusing on the police force, border security, and contractors, the military 
may be able to impact corrupt public officials more broadly.  
2. Corruption and its Effect on Stability 
Corruption represents the potential to reverse gains made during SO. Indicators of 
instability can be the lack of government capability or presence of an adversarial 
organization. Violent non-state actors (NSAs) have become an increasing concern to state 
leaders as the threat of terrorism becomes more prevalent. The appearance of criminal 
organizations in weakly governed countries usually precedes or coincides with the 
appearance of NSAs. Criminal organizations primarily participate in corrupt acts, which 
can support NSA operations, in addition to signaling a lack in state capacity to enforce 
the rule of law.68 Corruption undermines stability in two main ways: corruption presents 
                                                 
65 Stanley A. McChrystal and Mark Sedwill, ISAF Anti-Corruption Guidance (Kabul, Afghanistan: 
International Security Assistance Force, February 10, 2010). 
66 Ibid., 2. 
67 JALLC and NATO, Counter- and Anti-Corruption, 10. 
68 Jessica C. Teets and Erica Chenoweth, “To Bribe or to Bomb: Do Corruption and Terrorism Go 
Together?” ed. Robert Rotberg, Corruption, Global Security, and World Order (Cambridge, MA: World 
Peace Foundation, 2009), 168.  
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an opportunity to subvert rule of law, and also can create a safe-haven for NSAs in which 
to operate, plan, and coordinate.69  
First, corrupt officials represent an opportunity to bypass the national and 
international rule of law. At perhaps its most extreme, corruption empowers NSAs to 
proliferate nuclear weapons. Nuclear policy researcher Matthew Bunn discusses the 
increased availability of nuclear technologies, including weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD), from corrupt states through a case study of nuclear material and technology 
proliferation by Iran, Iraq, Libya, and North Korea from Pakistan.70 Political scientists 
Bryan R. Early, Matthew Fuhrmann, and Quan Li found that fighting corruption appears 
to be more effective in preventing nuclear proliferation by NSAs than increasing physical 
security measures around nuclear facilities.71 This finding may be due to corrupt officials 
being more likely to provide state secrets regarding WMDs, especially where little to no 
effective accountability is present.  
Second, the presence of a safe-haven has mass appeal for illicit organizations. 
Political scientists Jessica Teets and Erica Chenoweth posit that terrorist attacks will 
increase inside highly corrupt states, but will not necessarily target those same states.72 
NSAs have an increased opportunity to train, supply, and plan terrorist operations 
unimpeded in corrupt states due to reduced security and the ability to sway state officials. 
Political scientist Robert Rotberg states that “corruption facilitates, more than it 
motivates, terrorism.”73 In other words, state authority can be challenged through the use 
of corruption, in the form of coercive acts or changing the dynamics of a society, with a 
consequence of decreasing stability.  
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In addition to physical security challenges, corruption is prevalent throughout all 
phases of SO. Since the U.S. military partners throughout all levels of a host nation’s 
security forces, corruption is confronted at all echelons, and the types of corruption 
change depending on the governmental office engaged. For example, Mark Checchia, a 
professor of political science, has studied how the U.S. military has dealt with varying 
types of corruption within the Afghan National Security Forces, which include the 
Afghan military, police, and border security. Specific examples of corruption stem from a 
lack of accountability of military equipment and resources. This includes instances, such 
as Afghan officers extorting money and resources from their subordinates, buying and 
selling rank and positions, extorting Afghan civilians, as well as undue political influence 
within the military.74 It is worth noting that the different examples Checchia has 
identified are not unique to Afghanistan; they vary in the extent and severity with other 
global partner forces the United States works with as well.  
C. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK  
This thesis proposes the following model to define and analyze corruption, 
developed from Michael Johnston’s four-category differentiation of corruption. 
Specifically, it presents a four-by-four to show the relationship between Johnston’s 
corruption categories (see Figure 2).  
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Figure 2.  Categorization of Corruption75 
The x-axis is the measure of corruption along a continuum between material and 
people. “Material” is defined as physical goods that can be bought, sold, or traded for 
personal gain or profit. “People” includes average citizens to “specialized” individuals, 
such as those within the government. Overlap can occur at the margins, for example 
using a patronage system to install a black market. Michael Johnston’s corruption 
categories (market, patronage, nepotism, and crisis) can be paired together along the x-
axis. Market corruption and crisis corruption generally deal with materials, and patronage 
and nepotism generally deal with people.  
Stability is measured on the y-axis. Stability, as previously defined as a condition 
of homeostatic equilibrium in which the state’s populace, government, and social system 
structure is in balance with respect to its environment, can be left vague or can be 
specified with measureable metrics using the five categories from FM 3-07, depending on 
the context of the military mission. As previously stated, market corruption and patronage 
corruption are generally more stabilizing, and nepotism and crisis corruption are 
                                                 
75 Johnston, “The Political Consequences of Corruption: A Reassessment,” 466–474. 
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generally more destabilizing. In theory, therefore, anti-corruption efforts that move 
corruption from nepotistic to patronage would succeed in increasing state stability. The 
same can be said for moving crisis corruption to market corruption. It is worth 
mentioning again that Johnston states that all corruption can be stabilizing or 
destabilizing depending on the context, so U.S. military operations would greatly benefit, 
in theory, from an in depth study of a state’s history of corruption in order to understand 
its potential for stabilization or destabilization. 
This model (see Figure 2) also provides a means to categorize and prioritize anti-
corruption efforts. Corruption can be categorized into Johnston’s four types of corruption, 
and then anti-corruption efforts can be prioritized to address the most destabilizing forms 
first. Continuous monitoring should be conducted throughout the process to determine the 
target and rate of anti-corruption efforts. If conducted too rapidly, anti-corruption efforts 
can have unintended consequences. For example, China’s president, Xi Jinping, is 
conducting a campaign that is “dis-incentivizing some officials from starting new 
projects and instilling fear in others of being perceived or charged as corrupt,” stagnating 
several of China’s much-needed civil projects.76  
This model suggests that the military does not have to completely eradicate 
corruption, only move it from unstable to stable in order to positively affect operations. 
Moving specific instances of nepotistic corruption to patronage and crisis corruption to 
market on the model may establish stability within a state long enough for more 
substantial anti-corruption efforts to take root.  
D. CONCLUSION 
This chapter provided an overview of SO, defining what is meant by stability and 
offering avenues in which to focus implementation. Specifically, it provided a broader 
definition of corruption that acknowledges cultural variability along with further 
categorization of corruption beyond financial corruption. It also offered an overview of 
the effects of corruption during SO along with its destabilizing implications. Finally, the 
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chapter concluded with a model specific to the military to identify the most destabilizing 
types of corruption that could streamline military anti-corruption efforts.  
The next chapters will analyze case studies of Afghanistan and Iraq, in which 
state and international actors dealt with or perpetrated corruption, and the effects of 
corruption on SO. 
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III. CASE STUDY: AFGHANISTAN, CORRUPTION, AND 
STABILITY (1826–2015) 
In the past few decades, Afghanistan has been ranked as one of the most corrupt 
states in the world. In 2014, it was listed 172 out of 174 of the most corrupt states with 
only Sudan, North Korea, and Somalia placing lower.77 Compounding this problem, 
Afghanistan’s economy is wholly dependent on foreign aid; the United States alone has 
appropriated $107.5 billion dollars since 2002 toward the reconstruction of 
Afghanistan.78 However, numerous reports from the Special Inspector General for 
Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) claim that significant amounts of this money has 
disappeared and never reached the populace, further feeding corruption in Afghanistan.79  
Despite these recent examples, massive corruption is not a new phenomenon in 
Afghanistan. This chapter investigates the history of corruption in Afghanistan and how 
these different forms of corruption led to chronic instability in the country. The chapter 
builds on Chapter II, which offered a brief overview of corruption. It defines corruption 
as an instance where societal norms about fairness, equity, reasonableness, and the 
allocation of responsibilities, are violated. Chapter II further noted that corruption is more 
than financial, and includes military, political, and market forms of corruption that affect 
stability. Specifically, this thesis uses Johnston’s four types of corruption: crisis (the 
corruption that occurs during radical shifts in governance and politics), nepotism 
(favoring relatives or close friends, usually with government positions), patronage (the 
allocation of money or influence to supporters), and market (the illicit sale of products or 
services that bypass normal means of conveyance) to analyze the case. Finally, the 
chapter defines stability as a condition of homeostatic equilibrium in which the state’s 
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populace, government, and social system structure are in balance with one another. This 
chapter investigates the effects of corruption on Afghanistan’s homeostatic equilibrium.  
To understand why Afghanistan has such a problem with corruption today, it is 
necessary to sift through almost two centuries of persistent internal conflict and external 
interventions. The chapter, therefore, is broken into three broad periods in Afghanistan’s 
modern history. The first section offers three mini-cycles, starting with Dost Mohammad 
Khan Shah’s reign in 1826 and ending with the assassination of Mohammad Nadir Khan 
Shah in 1933. This section includes the Anglo-Afghan wars of the nineteenth century. 
The second section begins with the ascension of Mohammad Zahir Khan Shah’s 
monarchy in 1933 and finishes with the fall of Afghan President Mohammad Najibullah 
from power in 1992. The last section starts with the creation of the Islamic State of 
Afghanistan in 1992 and ends with the current state of affairs in 2015.  
This chapter finds that a cyclical pattern of corruption and destabilization evolved 
in modern Afghanistan over time. Leaders and intervening forces used patronage and 
nepotistic forms of corruption to consolidate power over fragmented and unstable 
territories. Once stability was achieved, attempts to modernize the state generally caused 
opportunities for market corruption. The central government’s policies marginalized the 
populace, creating instability, which led to external interventions and crisis corruption. 
The unstable environment, in turn, created opportunities for market and crisis corruption. 
Over time, the external occupiers capitulated and left, causing a power vacuum and 






A. BRITISH INFLUENCE AND THE AFTERMATH (1826–1933) 
1. Dost Mohammad Khan Shah—British Exhaustion (1826–1842) 
Beginning in the 1800s, the British and Russian empires engaged in what 
Rudyard Kipling referred to as “the Great Game,” both empires’ efforts to control key 
territory in Central Asia and deny the other dominance in the region.80 By the time 
British forces invaded Afghanistan in 1838, the two empires had already been engaged in 
a geopolitical strategic game for control over “the less advanced, more anarchic states of 
Asia.”81 Great Britain, seeking to create a buffer zone for India, invaded Afghanistan 
twice during this period to counter Russian influence, expansionism, and control.82  
In 1826, the Pashtun ruler Dost Mohammad Khan Shah inherited his position of 
authority and consolidated his power from a fortress in Kabul as the Amir ul-Moninin 
(Commander of the Faithful).83 Prior to Dost Mohammad’s reign, the state’s power was 
fragmented and limited to the immediate area around Kabul; however, the amir 
established an emerging state with a standing army and a national bureaucracy.84 Dost 
Mohammad chose to consolidate his power around Kabul by relying on nepotism and 
patronage to control territories outside the capital; his brothers governed the fertile lands 
of Jalalabad and the affluent city of Qandahar.85 Although the amir had influence over 
Kabul and the city Ghazni, the two main Pashtun tribes, the Ghilzai and Durrani, and the 
powerful princes and warlords that ruled over the other Afghan cities controlled the rest 
of the territory.86 Thus, Dost Mohammad ruled from Kabul, but the rest of Afghanistan 
was largely unaffected by the state’s reach.  
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This relatively stable period in Afghanistan started to disintegrate when internal 
and external challenges emerged in the late 1830’s. The amir brought in revenue for the 
state by forcibly collecting taxes from the rural areas, which in turn sparked sporadic 
rebellions from subjects who were not use to being taxed.87 At the same time, Dost 
Mohammad faced growing external problems from Russia and Persia in the West, and 
with the Sihks that controlled the city of Peshawar in eastern Afghanistan.88  
The advance of Russia into Persia and the threat of further incursions into 
Afghanistan prompted the British to invade southeast Afghanistan in 1839.89 By August, 
the British quickly seized Kabul and ousted Dost Mohammad. The British East India 
Company installed Shah Shuja of the Durrani family line, the grandson of a former 
Afghan amir, to further Britain’s interests. The British had cultivated their relationship 
with Shah Shuja well before he came to power by providing him with a luxurious pension 
20 years prior to taking the crown.90 Moreover, the British subsidized the ulama, Islamic 
clergy, and bought the support of prominent Durrani and Ghilzai leaders throughout the 
country with money and arms.91  
Almost immediately after the British gained control, they aimed to reconfigure the 
state to their needs. The British attempted to restructure Afghanistan’s military by 
creating a professional army that was supported directly by the state through taxation. 
This approach upset local tribal chiefs throughout eastern Afghanistan, who traditionally 
supplied the state’s army with civilians in exchange for half of the state’s revenue.92 The 
local chiefs’ loss of state revenue prevented them from financially supporting their tribal 
patronage networks. During this time market corruption also became a problem. British 
occupiers infused large sums of money into the local economy, which raised food and 
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other commodities’ prices, thus causing huge burdens on the local populace.93 The 
British were also accused of corrupting merchants and fostering prostitution due to the 
influx of soldiers and money in the cities.94 These unstable events created a groundswell 
of Afghan resentment toward the British occupiers.  
Afghan resentment continued to foment in the winter of 1841 as this cycle of 
corruption and inflation continued. On November 2, a mob attacked and killed Sir 
Alexander Burnes, the British political advisor to Afghanistan, along with his brother, at 
their shared residence.95 This event caused more uprisings. Instead of the British trying to 
bribe local warlords to end the unrest, local Afghan chiefs attempted to bribe the British 
in return for not interfering in their affairs.96 The British did not concede, and after the 
loss of its cantonment and the death of William Macnaughton, the political envoy to 
Afghanistan, the British retreated from Kabul on January 6, 1842.97 As the archeologist 
and anthropologist, William Dupree notes, the results of the British intervention can be 
summed up as “…after four years of disaster, both in honor, material, and personnel, the 
British left Afghanistan as they found it, in tribal chaos and with Dost Mohammad Khan 
returned to the throne of Kabul.”98  
This initial period of consolidated rule in Afghanistan reveals important clues 
about efforts to create stability and the role that corruption played in this process. From 
1826 until the first Anglo-Afghan war, Dost Muhammad was able to maintain the 
stability of the Afghan state through the use of patronage and nepotistic relationships, 
specifically by placing family members in positions of power within the fledging central 
government. This practice of using family and sponsor ties was consistent with how 
leaders had established rule for generations. Therefore this approach was culturally 
acceptable and led to a stable environment.  
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The British invasion in 1839 disrupted the stability of the state by deposing Dost 
Mohammad and replacing him with Britain’s chosen leader, Shah Shuja. Shah Shujah did 
not have the needed support from the old ruling elite. Moreover, Shah Shuja attained his 
power from the British, which the local leaders viewed as corrupt.99 Additionally, the 
rapid influx of money into the Afghan system from British forces was destabilizing, 
creating an environment for crisis and market corruption. Because these forms of 
corruption undermined the financial and political stability of the state, Afghan resentment 
boiled over and drove the British from Afghanistan, thus preventing them from achieving 
their goal of controlling this critical buffer zone.  
2. Dost Mohammad Khan Shah—Abdur Rahman Khan Shah 
(1845–1880) 
After the British retreated in 1842, Dost Mohammad returned to Afghanistan to 
consolidate his power and regain territory lost under Shah Shuja.100 The amir took 
advantage of the existing domestic military and financial reforms that the British created 
and gained enough support and money from the local populace to consolidate his 
domain.101 He also re-established a nepotistic monarchy by appointing family members 
to every official position throughout the state.102 In doing so, Dost Mohammad 
conquered the majority of the territory that constitutes modern-day Afghanistan, unified 
the country under a single government, and created a stable environment for most 
Afghans.103  
Dost Mohammad died in 1863 and was replaced by his son Sher Ali. Although 
Dost Mohammad’s family helped keep Afghanistan stable for many years, internal 
dissent eventually overtook the new leader.104 Sher Ali fought members of his own 
family for almost six years, ultimately causing a civil war. He eventually won the war—
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albeit only after losing the crown for a short period of time—and stability was restored 
through the creation of reforms. He created a national army, the first postal system, a 
Council of Elders, a tax collection system, and published Afghanistan’s first 
newspaper.105  
However, this relatively stable period in Afghan’s history also started to 
disintegrate when external interference increased in the late 1870s. The British still 
sought control of the region to provide a buffer from Russian influence. To this end, they 
began to bribe Sher Ali with considerable sums of money and arms.106 Despite the 
British gaining the support of Sher Ali, Russian Tsars began to reconquer parts of Central 
Asia. In response, the British used their influence over Sher Ali to allow British military 
leaders to enter Afghanistan and defend key areas, although eventually the British 
decided that a second invasion was necessary.107 
The Second Afghan war started in November 1878 with a 35,000-man British 
force aiming to take Kabul. Sher Ali turned to Russia for support but died shortly 
thereafter of natural causes and his son, Yakub Khan, inherited power. Without much of a 
fight, the British and Yakub Khan agreed on the Treaty of Gandamak in May 1879, 
ensuring the amir would surrender full control of Afghanistan’s foreign policy to the 
British along with territory that bordered India.108  
Although the treaty focused on Afghanistan’s foreign policy, the presence of 
British influence in the region was contentious. Almost immediately, the Ghilzai 
Pashtuns and the Kohistani Tajiks began attacking British posts and declared jihad on the 
foreign presence.109 The British quickly put the rebellion down, but at significant cost to 
British forces both in blood and resources.110 The British then expelled Yakub Khan 
                                                 
105 Dupree, Afghanistan, 404. 
106 Ewans, Afghanistan: A New History, 57. 
107 Richard S. Newell, The Politics of Afghanistan (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1972), 42. 
108 Peter Hopkirk, The Great Game: The Struggle for Empire in Central Asia (New York: Kodansha 
International, 1992), 385. 
109 Barfield, Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History, 142. 
110 Ewans, Afghanistan: A New History, 70. 
 36 
from the throne and installed Abdur Rahman, the grandson of Dost Mohammad Khan. 
Abdur Rahman was also from the same blood line as Yakub Khan but deemed more 
suitable. This decision most likely stemmed from the lessons the British learned from the 
first Anglo-Afghan war that, in order to control Afghanistan, they needed an amir that 
could subdue internal conflicts and centralize political power.111  
In July 1881, the British agreed to leave Afghanistan with the stipulation that 
Britain would not interfere in Afghanistan’s internal affairs; all British envoys would 
leave the country, and British aid and subsidies to the amir himself would continue to 
flow into Afghanistan if Abdur Rahman promised to ally with Britain and maintain the 
British territories near India.112 The agreement held, stability was restored, the British 
left Afghanistan, and Abdur Rahman began his rule over Afghanistan. 
This second episode of British influence demonstrates that corruption and its 
effects on stability in Afghanistan were less disruptive than the first invasion for several 
key reasons. First, the return of Dost Mohammad reestablished the stability of the state by 
using existing patronage and nepotistic networks. The British, in turn, while remaining in 
India, were able to influence Dost Mohammad, by using patronage and nepotistic 
networks already in place. In other words, the British worked through the culture and 
customs, rather than devising a plan that worked against the cultural norms. Dost 
Mohammad’s son, Sher Ali, inherited his father’s power after his death. This presented 
new challenges and opportunities for the British. The British initially decided to bribe 
Sher Ali in hopes that he would politically support their interests. However, Russian 
advances forced the British to invade. The British once again succeed in taking control of 
the country, but Afghan tribesmen soon attacked the infidels in their country. The British 
decided that it would be better to rule from afar and, therefore, installed Abdur Rahman 
and stipulated conditions that favored Britain.  
Ultimately, their second intervention had a better outcome because they were able 
to influence the Afghans from abroad using the existing patronal and nepotistic networks, 
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and they did not stay long enough to create the conditions for crisis or market corruption. 
Stability was reestablished, Russian influence was diminished, and Britain’s positive 
influence in the region was restored. 
3. Abdur Rahman Khan Shah—Mohammad Nadir Khan Shah 
(1896–1933) 
In 1896, Abdur Rahman Khan consolidated his political power over the state soon 
after the British left Afghanistan. He initiated a policy wherein he systemically 
suppressed any opposition to his throne by mercilessly executing his enemies and 
deporting whole tribes, such as the Ghilzai Pushtun, to different regions.113 He then 
consolidated his power by playing one tribe against the other and forcing arranged 
marriages between tribal members to create a nepotistic and patronal environment of 
loyalty and obedience.114 Although he would later become known as the Iron Amir for 
crushing his enemies, he would also be known for unifying the state and creating stability 
throughout Afghanistan. The result was “centralized political and economic power in 
Kabul [that] made Abdur Rahman the undisputed ruler of Afghanistan.”115  
After the death of the Iron Amir, his son, Habibullah Khan, took the throne in 
1901 and maintained Afghanistan’s internal stability.116 The amir chose to reverse many 
of the policies his father undertook during his reign. For example, he granted prominent 
members of the Musahiban tribe, who were ousted by his father, political immunity in 
addition to selecting them for key positions within his government.117 He used these 
patronage and nepotistic networks to control the tribes beneath him. Although Habibullah 
was assassinated in 1919, he instituted many reforms: he improved the country’s 
education and communication systems; he developed the first hydroelectric plant and 
hospital; and he maintained stability throughout the state.  
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Amanullah Khan succeeded Habibullah and continued in his footsteps by 
modernizing the Afghan state. After bribing officials in Kabul, Amanullah Khan gained 
control of Afghanistan’s arsenal and treasury and wrestled away control of the country 
from other key politicians in his family.118 Following this internal coup, the remaining 
political leaders and his brother recognized Amanullah Khan as the amir. Amanullah 
inherited “a vast pool of public animosity toward the British,” as evidenced by Afghan 
tribes attacking British posts along the border.119 Officially, he wrote to British officials 
requesting formal independence for Afghanistan. Simultaneously, he reached out tribal 
leaders in eastern Afghanistan and asked them to declare jihad on the British.120  
Amanullah’s actions started the third Anglo-Afghan war in 1919. The Afghans 
won the initial battles, but the British countered with aerial bombardments on the cities of 
Kabul and Jalalabad.121 Following a stalemate, both sides signed the treaty of 
Rawalpindi, which granted Afghanistan independence. However, the treaty hurt 
Afghanistan more than it did the British because the Afghans lost an important regional 
ally, subsidies, and aid, which ultimately destabilized the state and set up the amir’s fall 
from the throne.  
In 1927, following a trip through Europe and the Middle East, the amir initiated 
significant modernization changes in Afghanistan: a liberal constitution, new tax laws, 
and a new legal system. The amir also abolished slavery, initiated education for women, 
imposed universal military conscription, enforced the reduction of polygamy, prosecuted 
the harsh treatment of women, and ended child marriages.122  
Although the amir attempted to bring Afghanistan into the 20th century, he 
immediately received criticism from tribal leaders who did not accept cultural changes 
and did not have the money to pay for elaborate programs. Moreover, “while he was 
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concerned to root out corrupt practices, these were, paradoxically, increased through his 
creation of a bureaucracy that was, inevitably, susceptible to corruption and 
nepotism.”123 Tax collection revenues rarely made their way to the state because the 
collectors frequently pocketed the money.124  
In January 1929, Shinwari Pashtuns revolted, initiating a civil war. The amir 
escaped to India, eventually dying in Italy. General Mohammad Nadir Khan seized power 
in October 1929 and was declared the King of Afghanistan.125 However, his reign would 
not last long; Mohammad Nadir Khan was assassinated in November 1933 during a 
turbulent period in Afghanistan’s history.126 
The third cycle of Afghan leadership and British influence shows a similar pattern 
of efforts to create stability amidst patterns of corruption. Following the withdrawal of 
the British in 1896, Abdur Rahman took control of a fragmented, decentralized, and 
unstable state; he consolidated his power over the tribes and unified the nation. The Iron 
Amir was able to control Afghanistan through a nepotistic and patronage environment by 
arranging forced marriages and placing family and friends into key positions throughout 
his government. The amir created a stable state by relying on those kinship and patron 
ties, but he established this stability through oppression and war.  
After the death of Abdur Rahman, his son, Habibullah Khan, maintained stability 
for a short period of time by tapping into the existing patronage and nepotistic networks. 
He reversed some of his father’s policies and opened his government to the Musahiban 
tribe. In an attempt to modernize the country, he infuriated Afghans who did not want 
Russia or Britain to intervene in Afghanistan’s affairs. These events caused Habibullah’s 
downfall, eventually resulting in his assassination in 1919. Members of the Musahiban 
tribe were rumored to be behind the attack.  
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Amanullah Khan replaced Habibullah, changed the state’s title from Emirate of 
Afghanistan to the Kingdom of Afghanistan in 1926, and declared independence from 
Britain. The British stopped all economic assistance to Afghanistan, leaving the state 
financially in ruins. The king, just like his predecessors attempted to modernize the state 
by seeking outside economic assistance. He was able to secure some international aid, 
which led to several reforms, but his patronage network of tribal leaders would not accept 
the cultural changes. Finally, Amanullah’s drive for reforms was too swift and internal 
dissent quickly brewed, ultimately resulting in a civil war and the end of his rule. General 
Mohammad Nadir Khan seized power in 1929, but was also assassinated in 1933.  
B. MOHAMMAD ZAHIR KHAN SHAH—MOHAMMAD NAJIBULLAH 
(1933–1992) 
Following the death of Mohammad Nadir Khan in 1933, his 19 year old son 
Mohammad Zahir Khan ascended the throne but did not immediately rule. Due to his age, 
Mohammad Zahir relied on his three uncles and other family members, who held 
prominent positions within the government, to help consolidate his power over 
Afghanistan. The young king reigned and stabilized the state for the next 40 years, often 
referred to by Afghans as the “Golden Age.”127  
Mohammad Zahir began his rule in an era devoid of British economic aid, and he 
continued Amanullah Khan’s diplomatic policy of isolating Afghanistan from the 
Soviets. He understood early on that he needed to procure money quickly in order to 
maintain the stability of the nation and his hold over the Afghan people. With an 
expanding government bureaucracy and declining tax revenue, the king chose to extract 
revenue from the international community just as his predecessors had.128 Italy and Japan 
took initial interest in the country, but Germany quickly gained favor and engaged 
Afghanistan after Hitler’s Third Reich came into power.129 Afghan leadership welcomed 
the Germans into the country after they started fighting two of Afghanistan’s former 
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occupiers: the Russians and the British. Germany briefly helped modernize the country 
by building bridges and dams and allowing the company Siemens to produce electricity 
in the country.130 The Afghans’ pro-German sentiment was short lived, however, and the 
Soviets and British demanded Germany’s exit from Afghanistan following the end of 
World War II.  
Post-World War II Afghanistan became a battle ground for Cold War dynamics as 
both the United States and the Soviet Union sought to buy influence to keep the country 
aligned with their respective specific interests. The Afghans approached the United States 
for military and financial aid following the end of World War II. The United States 
provided a $17 million contract to build gravel roads linking the city of Kabul to 
Qandahar, an effort for which the Soviets later took credit.131 They also poured $60 
million into repairing old irrigation dams and building canals for the Helmand Valley 
irrigation plan, which was meant to bring water to new areas of Afghanistan for farming; 
however, this project was not completed until 30 years later.132 The Afghans requested 
multiple times for the United States to become Afghanistan’s arms supplier to counter the 
Russian threat, but every request was denied.133 The United States further strained its 
relationship with Afghanistan by supporting Pakistan and their anti-Pushtunistan state 
policy.134  
Due to these missteps, the Soviets gained a foothold and began providing aid to 
Afghanistan. Leon B. Poullada, a career Foreign Service officer, noted, “A careful 
analysis of the extensive Soviet economic, military, and cultural programs set in motion 
during the Daoud regime, 1953–1963, reveals a coherent, integrated and premeditated 
plan, disguised as something the Afghans themselves wanted and needed but in fact 
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serving first and foremost Soviet political, economic, and strategic interests.”135 Daoud 
wanted to modernize his country and needed external financial aid to strengthen his 
fragile military. The Soviets quickly stepped in and flooded the market with financial aid 
and subpar Soviet weaponry. As a result, the Afghans became dependent on the Soviets 
for military expertise, parts, and weaponry.136 This is an example of market corruption 
because the Soviets disrupted the Afghans free-market economy by offering cheaper 
products, but of an inferior quality. Daoud was able to equip the military at a reduced cost 
in the short-term, but in the long-term, it cost him his position within the government as 
Afghans became disgruntled with Soviet influence. 
The monarchy used both U.S. and Soviet aid to continue modernizing the country. 
The king guaranteed primary education for both sexes and allowed women to attend 
universities for the first time.137 Also during the same time, vast numbers of people were 
moving to the largest cities because of these broader opportunities. However, the 
government became overwhelmed with swarms of educated citizens who needed 
employment. Barfield states that, for the ones that did have government jobs, “the rate of 
pay was so meager that it encouraged endemic low-level corruption.”138 This is another 
example of the role that external aid played in creating market corruption. Although no 
examples were given, one can infer from similar cases that government workers obtained 
supplemental income by accepting bribes or selling government documents through illicit 
channels.  
Furthermore, Soviet aid introduced important changes to military culture that also 
caused corruption. Specifically, Soviet aid and influence allowed the Afghans to rapidly 
grow both its military and the bureaucracy that surrounded it. Barfield claims, “these 
changes proved fatal to old patrimonial ties as mid-ranking individuals in both the 
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military and bureaucracy came to see themselves as instrumental in preserving state 
power, no matter who held the reigns of command.”139 
The monarchy showed signs of fragility with three major events, starting in 1963. 
First, Daoud was quietly removed from power in 1963 after the king and the Kabul elite 
were dissatisfied with the Prime Minister’s handling of relations at the border with 
Pakistan. Second, Pakistan closed the border over an ongoing dispute between the two 
nations regarding political issues, which caused a considerable strain on the Afghan 
economy.140 Third, the king regained his authorities after Daoud’s departure and signed a 
new constitution establishing a bicameral parliamentary system and elections. This new 
system of government allowed dissention to be voiced in parliament, and it created an 
opening for the Marxist-Leninist leaning PDPA and other extremist groups to expand 
their membership and role in Afghan politics. The king’s creation of a fledgling 
democratic system also created opportunities for these political parties to use the 
parliamentary system against the royal family.  
Popular discontent further weakened Afghanistan’s stability. In 1972, student-led 
political demonstrations began in Kabul and moved throughout the country.141 
Simultaneously, a severe two-year long drought caused widespread famine, that was 
exacerbated by government incompetence and corruption.142 Barfield notes that, during 
this time, governors throughout Afghanistan were largely corrupt by the 1970s and were 
extorting as much money as possible from locals.143 Journalist John C. Griffiths also 
notes that, during this time, corruption was “a normal and inevitable ingredient in the 
Afghan way of life”; however, “the problem was to draw a dividing line between 
corruption and the customarily permissible nepotism.”144 The results were that 
destabilizing versions of corruption became acceptable because they maintained civil 
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servants’ livelihood. Griffith adds, “such practices were bound to continue as long as the 
government remained the only considerable source of patronage and as long as the 
parliamentary, ministerial and civil service salaries were so low that they made some of 
form of supplementary income—by private enterprise in some instances, by taking bribes 
in many others.”145 This represents another example of market corruption that held over 
from the last time period. Finally, nepotism and bribe-taking were flourishing as much 
under the new parliamentary system as they were in earlier regimes.146  
Daoud’s return to power in a bloodless coup in 1973 exacerbated market 
corruption. He abolished the monarchy and promoted himself to de facto President and 
Prime Minister of Afghanistan.147 Daoud promised to fix corruption by punishing those 
involved; however, bureaucrats eventually started to “demand even larger bribes to 
compensate for the additional risk they were now taking.”148 As a result, Daoud lost the 
trust of the bureaucrats, which led to Daoud’s presidency abruptly ending in 1978. 
In late April 1978, the “Saur Revolution” brought the PDPA to power, which was 
followed by a coup that put Nur Mohammad Turiki and Hafizullah Amin in control of the 
country. The Soviets invaded Afghanistan on December 24, 1979 to restore communist 
rule in Afghanistan.149 President Amin was killed and the Soviet Union installed Babrak 
Karmal to govern the country. Although Moscow was able to take control of Afghanistan 
quickly, just as the PDPA had done years before, they were not able to maintain the 
stability of the country and in turn increased the instability due to their invasion and 
subsequent presence as external occupiers.  
The Soviet Union spent the next 10 years in bloody conflict with groups that 
opposed them in what many historians refer to as Russia’s Vietnam.150 The United States 
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and Pakistan became involved and supported the Afghan resistance groups with weapons 
and money. After a long and costly intervention, the last of the Soviet troops left 
Afghanistan on February 15, 1989.151 The conflict resulted in 876, 825 Afghan deaths or 
roughly seven percent of the population.152 In addition, millions of Afghans were either 
internally displaced or made refugees in neighboring Pakistan and Iran.  
From the rise of King Mohammad Zahir Khan in 1933 to the Soviet troop 
withdrawal in 1989 and ensuing civil war, a pattern of stability, external intervention, and 
instability mirrored the previous era from 1826 to 1933. Following the end of British then 
German patronage, the king played both Russia and America against each other and 
managed to secure overwhelming amounts of financial aid, including $523.9 million 
dollars from the United States in economic assistance, $1.250 billion dollars in military 
aid, and $1.265 billion dollars in economic aid from the Soviet Union.153  
This aid and influence produced several forms of corruption that had short-term 
stabilizing effects, but then ultimately created instability. The Soviets implemented 
multiple strategies that made Afghanistan’s government dependent on them, resulting in 
patronage and market forms of corruption. Adding to the Afghan dilemma, the money 
was intended to support the populace, but most of the financial aid never extended past 
Kabul. The monarchy’s attempt at modernization backfired when the very people that the 
government educated and trained turned against Afghanistan’s rulers. Ultimately, Daoud 
attempted to curb corruption in the country by prosecuting and punishing individuals 
suspected of market and patronage corruption, but only caused the perpetrators to conceal 
their actions and demand more money.  
The patronage system created by Soviet aid eventually culminated with the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan to maintain its influence in the country. The result was for 
Afghanistan 10 years of war; economic, social, environmental, and structural devastation; 
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an enormous casualty and mortality rate; and gross instability. The Soviets left behind a 
shattered government that depended on nepotistic and patronage relationships for its 
stability. Without these stabilizing forces in place, the result was a three year civil war 
cast among rival Mujahedeen groups, and the rise of the Taliban.  
C. ISLAMIC STATE OF AFGHANISTAN—ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF 
AFGHANISTAN (1992–2015) 
After the Soviets departed Afghanistan in 1989, many political observers 
anticipated the collapse of the PDPA government within months. Contrary to their 
expectations, Afghan President Mohammad Najibullah was able to retain power for 
another three years until his removal from office in April 1992.154 Following his 
predecessors, Najibullah “planned to use continuing aid from the Soviet Union to 
consolidate his power through networks of patronage and by maintaining a powerful 
military.”155 His strategy worked until the Soviet Union collapsed in late 1991, which 
terminated financial aid to Afghanistan. Barfield remarks that Najibullah’s government 
was deeply affected by this loss of patronage because “Corruption was so rampant that 
the government bureaucracy absorbed 85 to 90 percent of the Soviet Aid intended for the 
population as a whole.”156 Although Najibullah lost Soviet support, he continued to rely 
on Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United States for financial aid. This support finally 
ended in 1992, but private donations from several Arab countries continued to flow into 
Afghanistan at an estimated $400 million dollars a year.157 Private donations were still 
not enough to make-up for the loss of external state support. Without substantial external 
aid, Najibullah was unable to keep the central government operating and his patronage 
networks, particularly former mujahedin leaders aligned under the “National Islamic 
Movement,” deposed Najibullah and his regime from Kabul.158  
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The unity of the National Islamic Movement quickly disintegrated into three 
major Mujahedeen groups commanded by three warlords: Jamiat-e-Islami (commanded 
by Ahmed Shah Masood), Hizb-e-Islami (commanded by Gulbadin Hikmetyar), and 
Jumbish-e-Milli (commanded by Abdul Rashid Dostum).159 The country was quickly 
“divided into warlord fiefdoms and all the warlords had fought, switched sides and fought 
again in a bewildering array of alliances, betrayals and bloodshed.”160  
In the midst of this fighting, most external state actors were unwilling to provide 
support, and corruption became rampant.161 With limited opportunities for financial 
support, the Mujahedeen groups started looking for illicit ways to raise capital by 
attacking the populace. Crisis and market forms of corruption dominated the landscape. 
Many of the leaders “sold off everything to Pakistani traders to make money, stripping 
down telephone wires and poles, cutting trees, selling off factories, machinery, and even 
road rollers to scrap merchants.”162 Shopkeepers were extorted, passengers in vehicles 
were forced to pay bribes, and women were being kidnapped, gang-raped, and killed.163 
For example, in 1993, Ahmed Rashid, a journalist, was stopped by at least 20 different 
groups demanding a toll for passage along a 130-mile stretch of highway, demonstrating 
the rampant forms of crisis and market corruption.164  
Afghanistan was in a state of failure—the currency was worthless, land for licit 
crop production was severely damaged due to the Soviet war, already poor rural villagers 
had little to no options, and warlords were fighting for power and resources; opium 
poppy cultivation and trade became a source of cash. Until the 1990s, the people of 
Afghanistan generally did not farm poppy crops, and opium usage and acceptance was 
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very low. Anarchy and war changed that.165 Without a functioning government or 
economy and few options, the warlords, traders, and Afghan people started creating their 
own market economy by trading the opium crops.166 This was a good example of when 
market and crisis corruption might be stabilizing in the short-term. Opium poppy 
cultivation would later contribute to the destabilization of Afghanistan in the late 1990s 
until the present day because of its significant economic value for everyone involved.  
Under these conditions, the Taliban began its rise to power. The Taliban started 
out as a group of Pashtun religious students who predominately traveled through the rural 
areas of Afghanistan to madrassas or religious schools.167 They believed in a strict 
interpretation of Islam that they learned while in Pashtun refugee camps in Pakistan or in 
foreign run madrasas. The Taliban grew as an ideological group after they “felt outrage at 
the behavior of the Mujahedeen leaders fighting for power in the city and decided to take 
action to end what they saw as corrupt practices, drawing on Islam as a justification for 
their intervention.”168 By 1996, the Taliban had recruited, organized, and developed a 
formidable fighting force that controlled the majority of the country.  
Although the Taliban did not focus on economic recovery, they were able to 
reverse some of the corruption throughout the country as they moved from town to town 
toward Kabul. They also meted out justice for Mujahedeen forces that were perpetrating 
the crimes against the populace, and began to reduce the country’s rampant drug trade.169 
Magnus and Naby note that the Taliban “were particularly vehement in their 
condemnation of the drug trade, which was not only against Islam but was also a major 
source of foreign influence and corruption in society through its vast profits.”170 In 1996, 
                                                 
165 UNODC, The Opium Economy in Afghanistan: An International Problem (New York: UNODC: 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2003), 87–88, http://www.unodc.org/unodc/search.html?q= 
the+opium+economy+in+afghanistan+unodc+2003. 
166 UNODC, The Opium Economy in Afghanistan: An International Problem, 89–91. 
167 Magnus and Naby, Afghanistan: Mullah, Marx, and Mujahid, 179. 
168 Peter Marsden, The Taliban: War, Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan, Politics in 
Contemporary Asia (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1998), 43. 
169 Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil, and Fundamentalism in Central Asia, 27–30. 
170 Magnus and Naby, Afghanistan: Mullah, Marx, and Mujahid, 182. 
 49 
the Taliban finally succeed in taking Kabul, forcing Afghanistan’s Defense Minister, 
Ahmed Shah Massoud, and his allies to flee to the north.171  
The rise of the Taliban presented opportunities for market and crisis corruption. 
Specifically, the timing was ripe for transforming “the legal agricultural economy into 
illegal poppy cultivation on a vast scale.”172 The Taliban quickly realized that they 
needed to raise capital in order to fund operations. Instead of angering local farmers, the 
Taliban allowed farmers to plant poppy crops, instead of their licit crops, to produce 
Opium in return for a zakat or Islamic tax.173 The Taliban eventually settled on a 20 
percent tax that provided the movement with $40–$50 million dollars annually.174 By 
1999, Afghanistan was responsible for producing 75 percent of the world’s opium, and 
96 percent of it was being cultivated in Taliban held territories.175 Moreover, by securing 
the highways, which allowed cross-border smuggling of other commodities, the Taliban 
made an estimated US $2.5 billion dollars by the end of 1996.176 The tide changed 
temporally in 2000, when the Taliban banned opium, explaining that it was un-Islamic. 
Opium production fell from “3,000 metric tons in 2000 to 74 metric tons in October 
2001.”177  
The unfettered rise of the Taliban ended in 2001. On September 11, Al-Qaeda 
attacked the United States, killing nearly 3,000 U.S. civilians. On October 1, President 
Bush declared that the U.S. military and its allies had begun striking targets in 
Afghanistan in order to “disrupt the use of Afghanistan as a base of operations and to 
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attack the military capability of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan.”178 With the help of 
the Afghan United Front (Northern Alliance), the United States and its allies were able to 
unseat the Taliban from power. Hamid Karzai was elected by delegates to run 
Afghanistan in 2002, following a loya jirga or meeting in Kabul. Although the United 
States and its allies were able to externally intervene, security and stability were more 
difficult to establish.  
Within little over a year of the invasion, disparate insurgent groups and warlords 
began to attack occupying powers and the fledgling Afghan government. In 2004, the 
Taliban reemerged and became another source of insecurity.179 According to Nasreen 
Ghufran, an international relations professor, “The Taliban’s return has been fueled by 
the frustration of ethnic Pashtuns seeking more political power in the government, public 
resentment of ongoing military operations, and the lack of economic opportunities for the 
general populace.”180  
Two forms of corruption that flourished under the NATO occupation were 
nepotism and patronage corruption. The post-Taliban system left very little room for 
competent people to work their way up the hierarchical chain without patronage 
support.181 From 2004 to 2010, President Hamid Karzai built a powerful patronage 
network by placing leaders throughout the government who were loyal to him and his 
family’s influence beyond the 2014 elections.182 According to James Risen, a reporter for 
the New York Times, “Dozens of Karzai family members and close allies have taken 
government jobs, pursued business interests or worked as contractors to the United States 
government, allowing them to shape policy or financially benefit from it”; they wield 
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considerable influence through government jobs and businesses throughout 
Afghanistan.183 
Market corruption has also thrived in post-Taliban Afghanistan. Black-markets 
have appeared in many of Afghanistan’s cities undercutting the government’s ability to 
curb corruption and collect taxes. These underground markets have become so popular in 
Afghanistan that they are called “Bush-markets” or “Obama-markets” due to their 
association with stolen or imitation American products being sold.  
Another form of market corruption that affected stability within Afghanistan was 
poppy cultivation and opium production. The Taliban were temporarily successful in 
reducing the production of opium up until Al-Qaeda attacked the United States. After the 
United States and its allies externally intervened in Afghanistan, poppy crops and opium 
production eventually surpassed pre-war levels; by 2006, Afghanistan was producing 
over 6,000 metric tons of opium despite coalition attempts to destroy the fields.184 
Although the United States spent approximately $7.6 billion dollars as of June 2014 to 
counter narcotics in Afghanistan, opium poppy cultivation is at the highest level it has 
ever been;185 in 2014, Afghan farmers cultivated approximately 224,000 hectares of 
opium, compared to approximately 74,000 hectares in 2002.186  
Foreign militaries have also created familiar forms of corruption in Afghanistan. 
According to Time Magazine reporter Jason Motlagh, “the presence of foreign armies in 
the country has for many years spawned supply and demand for [the occupier’s] 
homegrown products.”187 These items include everything from military and police body 
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armor to American treadmills.188 In 2010, roughly 790 civilian truckloads worth of gear, 
or 79,000 shipments, went missing, most likely ending up on the black market.189 
Nepotism is another type of corruption that has dominated Afghan politics in the 
post-Taliban era. In the past, this type of corruption was prevalent in both the central 
government and the tribal areas of Afghanistan. The rulers typically placed their family 
members into powerful positions in order to maintain control of the patrons and the 
populace. Patronage networks were used to extend the monarchy’s rule beyond the 
capital when the monarchy decided to collect taxes. Nepotism and patronage were 
stabilizing types of corruption in the tribal and clan areas because in many instances, the 
rural areas outside Kabul typically ruled themselves. Again, just like with patronage 
corruption, nepotism converted into a destabilizing form of corruption once massive 
amounts of unregulated aid entered the arena and the coalition needed Afghan partners to 
help with logistical support. An example comes from Michael O’Hanlon of the 
Brookings Institution, who reports that ISAF and NATO are actually reinforcing the 
corruption around Kandahar that supports the insurgency by relying on Afghan security 
firms and militias to “transport supplies, construct roads and bridges, and protect vital 
supply lines and military bases.” Moreover, these contracts directly support the Gul Agha 
Sherzai families and the Ahmed Wali Karzai families who together “control the 
economic and political favors throughout the province” and receive additional money 
from the United States for their services.190 
Crisis corruption has also continued since 2001 and Operation Enduring Freedom. 
Enormous amounts of reconstruction aid have flowed into Afghanistan over the last 14 
years from the international community. The United States has appropriated $107.5 
billion dollars of reconstruction aid since 2002, and Congress will contribute another $16 
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billion dollars of aid through 2015.191 This financial aid does not include other donor 
nations or U.S. military and federal agencies support in Afghanistan. An example that 
exemplifies the crisis corruption issue since 2001 comes from an excerpt written by 
Qiamuddin Amiry, president of the Afghans Scholar Initiative, concerning a small village 
in Bamiyan province:  
In 2002, $150 million could have transformed the lives of the inhabitants 
of villages like this one. The money was received by an agency in Geneva, 
who took 20 percent and subcontracted the job to another agency in 
Washington DC, who also took 20 percent. Again, it was subcontracted 
and another 20 percent was taken; and this happened again when the 
money arrived in Kabul. By this time there was very little money left; but 
enough for someone to buy wood in Western Iran and have it shipped by a 
shipping cartel owned by a provincial governor at five times the cost of 
regular transportation. Eventually some wooden beams reached to the 
villages. A young man explained: “the beams were too large and heavy for 
the mud walls that we can build. So all we could do was chop them up and 
use them for firewood.”192 
Beginning in 2008, the Congressionally appointed SIGAR began providing 
independent investigations and objective oversight of aid projects in an attempt to save 
taxpayers’ money and promote economic efficiency and transparency.  
The United States and its allies have finally become exhausted in its occupation of 
Afghanistan, just like other great foreign states before them. Starting in 2011, the United 
States and its coalition partners reduced troop levels with an end goal for all troops 
leaving Afghanistan by 2015; however, the 2014 Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) 
permits at least 9,800 U.S. troops to stay beyond December 2014.193 Additional aid will 
continue to flow into Afghanistan, but at much lower levels than previously recorded. 
After 14 years of occupation and development, the United States and its coalition partners 
are leaving Afghanistan with a fledging economy, a persistent insurgency, and 
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questionable security forces. Within these challenges, Afghanistan’s level of corruption is 
at an all-time high according to the Transparency Index 2015.194  
The United States and its allies fell into the same trap as Britain and the Soviet 
Union had years ago. All of these actors intervened and quickly conquered Afghanistan. 
They all achieved short-term stability by concentrating on security and creating a 
bureaucracy based on their own individual political systems, whether those were 
imperialist, communist, or democratic. All of these nations placed leaders of their choice 
into positions of power.  
Patronage corruption also flourished during this time. Patronage corruption and 
nepotism has historically been both stabilizing and destabilizing for the Afghans. For 
example, according to the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime, Afghans surveyed 
increasingly view patronage and bribery as acceptable social practices; 
68 per cent of citizens interviewed in 2012 considered it acceptable for a 
civil servant to top up a low salary by accepting small bribes from service 
users (as opposed to 42 per cent in 2009).…[and] 67 per cent of citizens 
considered it sometimes acceptable for a civil servant to be recruited on 
the basis of family ties and friendship networks (up from 42 percent in 
2009).195 
Afghanistan’s tribal-based societies have always relied on patronage and 
nepotistic networks to function. For the most part, history has shown that these types of 
corruption had stabilizing effects when Afghanistan was ruled by a powerful leader and a 
small centralized government that permitted, to a certain degree, the autonomy of the 
tribes. Only when the ruler attempted to modernize the state or when external actors and 
their money were introduced into the Afghan way of life did these types of corruption 
become destabilizing. Afghans are now more tolerant and accepting of patron-client 
relationships, bribery, and nepotism than ever before. The results have been that very few 
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people have any chance of moving up the hierarchal chain within the government based 
on merit.  
Finally, crisis and market forms of corruption have contributed to both the 
stability and instability of the Afghan state. An excellent example is poppy cultivation 
and opium production. Before 2000, the Taliban allowed farmers to plant poppies on 
their lands. Although the Taliban collected a 20 percent tax, the farmers made more 
money planting poppies than traditional crops.196 The farmers, therefore, had more 
money to buy other products and a local stable economy was created. However, after the 
United States and its allies entered Afghanistan, opium production decreased as the 
coalition and Kabul government cracked down on the now illicit crops. This caused a 
destabilizing effect because many of the farmers were left with no alternative other than 
to plant crops that were substantially less rewarding.  
D. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, a circular pattern of stability, corruption, and instability has added 
to the current situation in Afghanistan. The pattern is perpetuated by efforts to 
consolidate power and is composed of six phases. The cyclical pattern begins with the 
consolidation of the state. This is a period of time when the central government is 
typically strong and relatively stable. Patronage and nepotistic forms of corruption are 
predominant during this period. The next phase begins with an effort by the central 
government to modernize the state, which at times produces opportunities for market 
corruption. Inevitably, dissent grows in a portion of the population that feels 
marginalized. These disaffected groups create quid pro quo relationships to form 
coalitions that eventually challenge the central government. External actors intervene and 
set the conditions for crisis corruption to occur. Eventually, exhausted external actors 
capitulate, withdrawal, and are replaced by an internal interim government. This newly 
formed central government attempts to reconsolidate power by exploiting patronage and 
nepotistic relationships among the elites and numerous tribes throughout Afghanistan. 
During this transition, internal conflicts rise between the ruling elite and competing 
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tribes. After a contentious period of internal governance, the cycle repeats once again 
with an attempt by the country’s elite to consolidate the state (see Figure 3). 
 
Figure 3.  Afghanistan’s Cyclical Pattern of Corruption and Instability  
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IV. CASE STUDY: STABILITY, CORRUPTION, AND IRAQ 
(1914–2014) 
Corruption in Iraq is not a new occurrence. The use of corruption by occupying 
powers and ruling elites has historically created a pattern of behavior that has led to 
several collapses in state stability, including the 1920 Arab revolt, the overthrow of King 
Faisal II in 1958, a series of coups and countercoups in the 1950s and 1960s, the rise of 
Ba’athist Iraq, and the U.S.-led invasion in 2003. Corruption, although not the only 
factor, has greatly supported the destabilization of Iraq in its 95 years as a state.  
Chapter II offered a brief overview of corruption. It defines corruption as an 
instance where societal norms about fairness, equity, reasonableness, and the allocation 
of responsibilities, are violated. Chapter II further noted that the term corruption refers to 
more than financial corruption, and includes forms of military, political, and market 
corruption that affect stability. Specifically, this thesis uses Johnston’s four types of 
corruption—crisis (the corruption that occurs during radical shifts in governance and 
politics), nepotism (the favoring of relatives or close friends, usually within government 
positions), patronage (the allocation of money or influence to supporters), and market 
(the illicit sale of products or services that bypass normal means of conveyance). Finally, 
stability is a condition of homeostatic equilibrium in which the state’s populace, 
government, and social system structure are in balance with one another. Specifically, 
this chapter aims to investigate the effects of corruption on Iraq’s homeostatic 
equilibrium.  
This chapter considers the role that internal influence (societal and governmental 
influence within a state) and external influence (outside actors) play in changing stability, 
and the types of corruption these influences introduce into Iraq’s history. Specifically, 
this chapter looks at three periods in Iraq’s history: the British Mandate, beginning in 
1920; the rule of the Ba’ath party from 1968 to 2003; and U.S. and coalition  occupation 
of Iraq from 2003 to 2011. Each section analyzes the level of stability and the effects that 
specific types of corruption had on stability. Within each timeframe, the chapter answers 
three questions: Was stability established during a specific timeframe and if so how? 
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What types of corruption were present? And how did corruption affect stability within 
Iraq?  
This chapter finds that the current destabilizing forms of crisis corruption in Iraq 
originated from market and patronage corruption introduced under the British Mandate. 
These forms of corruption grew under the Ba’ath party, in conjunction with oppressive 
policies, as a way to suppress individuals and groups that grew increasingly antagonistic 
toward their regime. This dynamic was shattered with the U.S. invasion of Iraq, in which 
unchecked crisis corruption ultimately contributed to an unstable and insecure 
environment, and the exacerbation of sectarianism.  
A. THE BRITISH MANDATE OF IRAQ (1920–1932) 
The Ottoman rule of Iraq, which began in 1534, focused on major urban cities, 
dividing the region into three vilayats—Basra, Baghdad, and Mosul—each with five 
distinct administrative departments. Retired U.S. Army General Julian Cunningham notes 
that the Ottoman departments were “notable mainly for the graft and corruption 
connected therewith, with the resultant dissatisfaction on the part of the inhabitants.”197 
In addition to these urban centers, which were Sunni run, the Ottomans managed the 
hinterlands by leveraging one tribe against the other.198 The Ottomans gave Shia tribes 
near the Euphrates River governing autonomy.199  
Britain began occupying Iraq in 1914 as a preemptive strike against the Ottoman 
Empire, which the British suspected was siding with the Central Powers in World War I. 
Britain captured Basra on November 21, 1914 in order to protect their communications 
and interests, as well as the oil fields near the Persian Gulf, and by 1918, it had seized the 
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Baghdad and Mosul vilayats.200 Prior to their retreat, the Ottoman officials burned 
government records, leaving an administrative void.  
The British initially used the same administrative policy from India, what was 
called “the India Office,” to stabilize Iraq until its political fate could be determined. 
Specifically, it imposed the laws developed to govern India without taking into account 
cultural differences between the two countries.201 British Field Marshall Sir Arthur 
Barrett imposed the civil administrative policy, which consisted of subdividing each 
vilayat into sub districts and empowering personnel to administer those areas, including 
levying taxes and imposing judiciary powers.202  
Through the India Office, the British empowered a patronage system that 
bordered on cronyism. The India Office established central government control in all 
areas of the vilayats, including the rural areas; tribal sheikhs were appointed as the 
“instruments of government.”203 Cunningham argues that “every effort was made to 
concentrate power in one man.”204 For example, Captain H. R. P. Dickson was able to 
consolidate the power of 22 Suq tribes under a single sheikh.205 These sheikhs then had 
to “collect revenue, maintain order, settle minor disputes and provide tribal labor for 
public works.”206 Furthermore, the appointed sheikhs could establish patrols,207 and, in 
extreme cases, request the assistance of the British army to suppress rebellions. Judith S. 
Yaphe, a professor of Middle East history, asserts that “enhanced by self-interest, [the 
sheikhs] reverted to autocratic authoritarianism and were increasingly alienated from 
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their natural power base.”208 In other words, the sheikhs needed subordinates they could 
trust, primarily relatives, to manage their different tasks; this created a system of 
nepotism within the administration. 
The British also engaged in crisis corruption during this time. Reliance on oil was 
one of the major factors in the British decision to invade Iraq.209 To this end, the British 
engaged in near slave labor and seizure of state property in order to extract necessary 
quantities of resources to fulfill their requirements.210 Crisis corruption also spread to the 
acquisition of resources within Iraq to sustain a British force of 420,000 from 1915 to 
1918.211 British actions “caused conditions of near-famine in 1917–18, and the resulting 
food shortages and inflationary pressures hurt the urban populations.”212 
Adding to the fragile stability was the British misuse of force. The British military 
aided the India office, and “dispensed ‘severe punishment’ on hostile tribes that resisted 
the imposition of British control.”213 For example, when the British experienced tribal 
resistance, they would bomb houses during the night, killing women and children. They 
also engaged in public hangings, and conducted what became known as a “general 
slaughter policy.”214 This approach compelled local tribes to continuously challenge 
British rule.  
The British policy from 1918 to 1920 was a continuation of war practices after the 
conclusion of World War I. The British extended wartime demands for tribal manpower 
for military construction works, taxed crops up to 25 percent, and expanded the British 
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policy into tribal matters, increasing the resentment within the populace.215 Historian 
Kristian Coates Ulrichsen notes that formerly ungoverned Shia tribes in western Iraq 
became more irate over the increasing interference of the British in “local political, 
economic and social resources in the occupied territories.”216 
In 1920, the League of Nations awarded the mandate for Iraq to Britain at the San 
Remo conference.217 “The British Mandate” empowered the empire’s oversight of Iraq’s 
political and economic fate. Shortly after being awarded control of Iraq, the Arab 
population rebelled in what became known as the Revolution of 1920. Specifically, the 
1920 revolt occurred “to defend [tribal] traditional rights and privileges, which the new 
regime of British colonialism threatened to undermine.”218 Furthermore, international 
pressures, specifically President Wilson’s “Fourteen Points” further exacerbated Iraqi 
relations under British Rule; point 12 in particularly alluded to Iraq autonomy advocating 
“the other nationalities, which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an 
undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous 
development.”219 Combined Sunni and Shia demonstrations in May and June 1920 were 
early manifestations of the discontent with British rule.220 A tribal uprising in Rumaytha 
sparked a four month uprising of 131,000 Arabs against the British.221 While the Arabs 
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suffered 10,000 dead,222 the British sustained 1,540 casualties along with the financial 
cost of 40 million pounds.223 
The Revolution of 1920 confirmed Britain’s prejudices against the Shia. Although 
Sunni involvement did occur, the 1920 revolt was centralized in the Shia territories in the 
Euphrates river areas. The Shia dominated revolt echoed Gertrude Bell’s opinion that 
“the Sunni element should take authority in the new Iraqi state, in spite of their numerical 
inferiority, to forestall a ‘mujtahid-run, theocratic state, which is the very devil.’”224 This 
prejudice against the Shia would last throughout British rule, setting a precedent for the 
“marginalization of the Shia from the centres of power.”225  
Patronage corruption became increasingly visible during and after the Revolution 
of 1920. Specifically, the British instituted a patronage system rewarding the Sunnis for 
their loyalty, while neglecting and marginalizing the Shia. Shortly after the mandate era 
began, the British created the Council of State, a puppet institution that gave the 
appearance of autonomy, which favored the Sunni. This initial governing body helped 
populate all Iraqi governmental positions with Sunnis thereafter. British historian Ian 
Rutledge contends “This absence of representative state formation at the birth of the Iraqi 
nation established a dark precedent for the future conduct of Iraqi politics.”226  
The British appointment of King Faisal I on August 23, 1921, was the greatest 
example of patronage corruption that aimed to establish stability in Iraq. The British 
chose Faisal as monarch “because of his history of cooperation and the assumption that 
[the British] could manipulate him,” leading to his unanimous election by the Council of 
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State under Sir Percy Cox’s direction.227 The British effectively made parliament answer 
to the king; the king approved all laws and could issue ordinances without parliamentary 
approval.228 The decision to install King Faisal I as head of state in Iraq ironically united 
the different tribes and ethnic groups in Iraq; he was regarded as a symbol of British 
influence in Iraqi politics.229 
Nepotism corruption was an important destabilizing byproduct of the British 
instituted patronage system. In addition to installing King Faisal as head of state, several 
of the officers who served with him during World War I also returned with King Faisal, 
deposing older notables installed by the British.230 Sir Kinahan Cornwallis, the British 
advisor to King Faisal, noticed how British empowerment of the king led to “harmful 
effects of widespread nepotism and the low moral tone of public life.”231 The nepotistic 
network “became an arena in which corrupt political cliques and personalities…would 
struggle against each other to seize the material spoils of power.”232 
British influence was solidified by the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930. The treaty 
stipulated King Faisal had to “heed Britain’s advice on all matters affecting British 
interests, especially on fiscal policy, so long as Iraq was in debt to Britain.”233 It was also 
agreed that Britain and Iraq would renegotiate the treaty after 25 years, in 1955—a 
political event that never actually occurred.234 This era concluded with the overthrow of 
King Faisal II in 1958 and the rise of Ba’athist power in the country.  
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This initial period of Iraq’s formation of a state under British oversight contained 
several types corruption identified by Johnston, all of which affected the fledging 
country’s stability. First, the British’s initial use of patronage corruption had an 
immediate stabilizing effect. The use of tribal sheikhs to stabilize the rural areas and 
empower the Sunni minority over the Shia established authority and stability over the 
region. Specifically, the British were able to harness tribal sheikhs’ and Sunnis’ informal 
networks of influence to bring dissidents under control. However, these methods of 
controlling the population became less effective and destabilizing over time.  
Iraq became an independent state in 1932. However, the British continued to 
influence Iraqi affairs until 1956 when they failed to renegotiate the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty 
of 1930. The removal of British stewardship demonstrated the long-term effects of 
various forms of corruption they had used to stabilize the country. As will be described, 
Iraq fell into a decade-long period of political instability that included a series of coup 
and counter-coups.  
Second, the British use of crisis corruption, especially after World War I, was 
never stabilizing and only served to disenfranchise the Iraqi populace and generate an 
anti-British movement that constantly challenged British governance and oversight. The 
exploitation of Iraq’s natural resources caused increased subjugation of the local 
populace, especially as the British used native labor to extract their spoils. By the same 
token, excessive taxation in the form of farm yields decreased the available food supply 
for the Iraqi populace and increased the growing rift, fueling discontent within the 
country.  
Finally, the imposition of a foreign monarch, an example of patronage corruption, 
further led to instability and necessitated continuous British intervention. Since most 
groups considered King Faisal to be a puppet of the British, his legitimacy mirrored the 
population’s opinion of the British, which was increasingly negative. Also, the 
introduction of King Faisal initiated the institutionalization of Sunni nepotism within 
Iraq, as former officers returned with Faisal and occupied authoritative positions in the 
government and military.  
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B. THE BA’ATH PARTY (1968–2003) 
The years 1958–1968 consisted of four regime changes and numerous failed 
coups that historian Phebe Marr claims “ruptured the institutions of the state, brought 
constant and dramatic shifts in policies and orientations, and eroded the country’s still 
fragile national identity.”235 The July 17, 1968 Ba’athist coup, led by Ahmad Hasan al-
Bakr and Saddam Hussain, almost immediately initiated judicial actions against real, 
potential, or imagined challengers; the first victims came from the recently overthrown 
Arif regime.236 Immediately after the coup, Saddam deported two of his co-conspirators, 
Colonels Ibrahim Abd al-Rahman Da’ud and Abd al-Razzaq Nayif, to Jordan and 
Morocco, respectively, and replaced them with Ba’ath party members.237 Other groups, 
such as liberals, the Iraqi Communist Party, and members of the Shia Da’wa party, were 
later jailed, executed, or exiled. Marr explains that these trials demonstrated “the 
ruthlessness of the regime and made clear that no attempt to overthrow Ba’ath rule would 
be tolerated.”238 Most notably, Saddam foiled a military coup in 1970, resulting in the 
execution of 37 military officers.239  
The Ba’athists used patronage and nepotism to secure their power. During the 
initial purges, Saddam appointed his relatives into vacant positions, drawing from four 
major Tikriti clans: the Bakr, Talfah, al-Majid, and Ibrahim families.240 The nepotistic 
network provided Bakr and Saddam with a “stronger guarantee of loyalty” than any other 
social structure, and because the Tikritis dominated key positions within the regime, their 
de facto rule was secured within the Ba’ath party as well.241  
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Expansive social programs ensured the Ba’ath regime was able to assuage the 
populace, taking away the popular support for coup attempts. Iraq’s oil infrastructure was 
nationalized on June 1, 1972, with the approval of Iraqi Law 69, providing the Ba’ath 
regime needed revenue to support several social programs.242 The regime won the loyalty 
of the Shi’a by establishing state run collective farms that dislodged powerful 
landowners, and by providing electricity to approximately 4,000 rural villages along with 
free refrigerators and televisions.243 More broadly, a social system was established that 
“provided widespread health, education, and social benefits that went beyond those of 
any previous regime.”244 Saddam used the social programs “to mitigate tensions and 
distract attention from the harsh and brutal measures of the regime.”245  
The Da’wa party in Iraq was particularly targeted due to their goal of “the 
overthrow of the regime and the imposition of an Islamic state.”246 For example, during a 
demonstration in February 1977, “2,000 demonstrators were rounded up and some 500 
interrogated.”247 Similarly, after the Soviet supported 1978 coup in Afghanistan, the 
Ba’ath regime executed approximately 21 Iraqi Communist Party leaders in order to deter 
coup attempts in Iraq.248 The Ba’ath regime also targeted the Kurds because of their 
international support, primarily from Iran. The Iraqi government instituted mass 
relocation of Kurds throughout Iraq and the destruction of some 1,400 Kurd villages 
along the Iran-Iraq border by 1978.249  
The Ba’athist regime underwent a change of power from Bakr to Saddam Hussein 
in July 1979. Saddam instituted harsher policies by immediately purging rivals within the 
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Ba’ath party.250 Saddam established a totalitarian stability in Iraq through two primary 
means: eliminating his direct competition and assuaging the populace. Saddam’s policy 
was to “never share power,”251 leading to “a series of trials, executions, and arrests” that 
were directed against his political rivals in the military and in other political groups.252  
As president, Saddam was able to maintain stability through the manipulation of 
power bases in Iraq, specifically “the Ba’ath Party, the security establishment, the 
military, and his own family cliques.”253 Saddam was able to simultaneously empower 
and subvert each power base at will. For instance, Saddam emplaced a nepotistic network 
in the military enabling him to “bypass the [Ba’ath] party and the military and keep 
control over these institutions.”254 Saddam also conducted a purge of the Ba’ath party in 
July 1979 after a coerced confession by Muhie Abdul Hussein Mashadi falsely implicated 
66 Ba’ath party members as conspirators in a Syrian developed coup plot.255  
Saddam also targeted the Iraq military, particularly the officer corps, in which he 
placed key family and tribal members. The extensive nepotism within the Iraqi military 
created an incompetent officer corps. Saddam, in an attempt to control the military, 
purged experienced officers and appointed members of the Tikriti tribes. Political 
scientist Risa Brooks notes that “the centralization of command chains, purges, 
politicized appointment criteria and the tendency to select from privileged minorities all 
impose limitations on battlefield proficiency.”256 
Nowhere is the corrupting effects of Saddam’s influence on the military seen 
more than during the Iran-Iraq war of 1980–1988, in which Saddam attempted to claim 
contested land with Iran and curb its revolutionary influence in the region. A retired 
senior British officer stated that the Iraqi “command level is unbelievably bad… the Iraqi 
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general staff seems to be a farce. They used to refer to the British Army in World War I 
as ‘lions led by donkeys.’ Iraqi soldiers are tigers led by a pack of jackasses.”257 Saddam 
ultimately had to “keep ‘political’ (Ba’athist) officers off the battlefield and let competent 
officers reorganise the army and especially the air force.”258 After eight years and an 
estimated half million military and civilian casualties, the war ended in a strategic 
stalemate and massive war debt for both sides.259  
To avoid coup attempts following the Iran-Iraq war, Saddam fostered support 
within the military by “setting up subsidised markets, giving highly decorated officers 
automobiles and lowering the criteria for admission into colleges and universities for 
members of the armed forces.” Brooks further states that Saddam also “doubled salaries, 
eased the terms of military service and lowered the retirement age for officers.”260  
Saddam invaded Kuwait in 1990 in order to secure greater access to Gulf ports261 
and to seize the Rumaila oil field that straddles the Iraq-Kuwait border.262 The United 
States intervened, forcing Iraq to retreat. After the war, the UN imposed economic 
sanctions on Iraq, increasing the abysmal conditions of the population within the 
country.263 Rather than inspire a rebellion, the UN sanctions furthered the populace’s 
dependence on the state, effectively increasing Saddam’s control.264 For example, in July 
2001, the Iraqi government failed to grant humanitarian visas to 280 United Nations 
officials, leaving the distribution of humanitarian assistance to Iraqi officials. The 
officials resold the supplies on the black market, requiring the population to pay for these 
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necessities. Historian Michael Rubin suggests that because the sanctions benefitted the 
loyalists, the sanctions’ effect was to “actually strengthen the regime itself.”265  
Under the UN “oil-for-food” sanctions, market corruption was used by the 
Saddam regime for personal economic gain. The Iraqi vice president, Taha Yassin 
Ramadan, called for the inflation of oil contracts by at least 10 percent. The extra money 
would be paid in cash, and then funneled into the Iraqi accounts in Jordan and the United 
Arab Emirates.266 Oil smuggling generated approximately $900 million annually for the 
central government.  
Alongside illegal oil sales, Saddam took advantage of medical supplies designed 
to help the population. For example, the regime accepted UN donated pharmaceuticals 
and sold them in Lebanon.267 Contracts for other medical supplies were used as a form of 
bribery and were allotted based on “which country was on the [UN] Security Council.”268 
Dr. Khidr Abbas, the Iraqi Interim Minister of Health, canceled $250 million worth of 
Ba’athist contracts for drugs, medical equipment, and maintenance agreements that were 
never delivered.269 Most of the revenue gained through market corruption was diverted to 
the Saddam regime for payoffs to the top elites, ensuring no one would have the ability to 
overthrow Saddam. 
Furthermore, government jobs, only available to regime loyalists, provided a 
lucrative means of salary augmentation through the sale of official documents.270 
Political scientists David Palkki and Shane Smith add that “The regime’s preferential 
ration allotments to government employees and regime supporters incentivized fealty, 
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thus strengthening the regime.”271 It was not until the United States invaded in Iraq in 
2003 with the stated goal of removing Saddam Hussein from power that this system of 
corruption was disrupted.  
The longevity of the Ba’ath regime was a result of a patronage network at the 
highest levels within the regime, similar to that of the network that functioned during the 
British Mandate.272 The Ba’ath party centralized control of Iraqi natural resources, key 
governmental positions, and other social sectors, such as education,273 and used these 
resources to develop and pay off a vast patronage network. This form of corruption was 
especially prevalent during the Iran-Iraq War in which “‘good’ citizens were rewarded 
with extra rations, while those who caused trouble could be denied food altogether.”274 
By 1990, approximately 60 percent of the Iraqi population was dependent on the 
government, allowing the Ba’ath regime to reward and punish ethnic groups and tribes 
based on their actions.275  
After the 1991 Gulf War, Saddam empowered Sunni tribal sheikhs south of 
Baghdad to act on his behalf, mirroring British policy 70 years before. Additionally, 
some Sunni tribes were allowed to form militias armed with light weapons, howitzers, 
and rocket-propelled grenades.276 The patronage networks in Iraq exchanged resources 
and power for continued loyalty to the regime.  
Saddam also used economic and market forms of corruption to retain control of 
the populous. International interventions, in the form of sanctions, created an 
environment where institutionalized market corruption flourished. The resale of medical 
aid to regime loyalists reduced the available supply of medications and medical 
equipment to the Iraqi people. More importantly, the illicit sale of Iraqi oil in direct 
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contention with the oil-for-food program generated immense wealth for the Saddam 
regime and was used to further its political and military dominance. 
Ultimately, the stability that the Saddam regime experienced was primarily based 
on the networks he formed through the use of corruption. The patronage network initially 
established by the Ba’ath party encompassed the majority of the state even though the 
party was run by the ethnic minority. Legislation ensured that political survival and 
upward movement within the government were supervised by the Ba’ath party, leading to 
increased population dependence. The nepotistic network ensured that family members 
were indebted to Saddam, thereby increasing genuine loyalty. Finally, market corruption 
allowed the regime to prosper under international sanctions while the population was 
dependent on the state for their physical survival. At the center, the Ba’ath regime 
maintained stability through heavy exclusion policies that ultimately bred resentment 
from the ethnic Shia and Kurdish populations, as the United States would later discover.  
C. U.S. COALITION OCCUPATION OF IRAQ (2003–2011) 
The United States invaded Iraq under two pretenses: first, the United States aimed 
to reduce the threat posed by Saddam Hussein and his purported nuclear weapons 
program. Second, the invasion of Iraq was an indirect result of Al-Qaeda’s attack on the 
United States. Some in the United States’ leadership believed that Saddam Hussein had 
ties to Al-Qaeda, assertions that later were proved to be untrue. President George W. 
Bush underscored this notion on January 28, 2003 stating that “a brutal dictator, with a 
history of reckless aggression, with ties to terrorism, with great potential wealth, will not 
be permitted to dominate a vital region and threaten the United States.”277  
The initial invasion plan was limited to the overthrow of the Saddam regime. U.S. 
and coalition forces invaded on March 20, 2003, capturing Baghdad and the country on 
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April 9, 2003. U.S. forces killed Saddam’s sons, Uday and Qusay, on July 22, 2003; 
Saddam was captured on December 14, 2003.278 
Although the United States-led invasion achieved its goal of removing Saddam, it 
created an unstable security environment. Almost immediately after the Saddam regime 
was toppled, Iraqi citizens began looting government buildings, facilities, and Ba’ath 
party members’ houses.279 Looting soon gave rise to graver acts of violence because 
“coalition forces appeared unable or unwilling to curtail the violence that swept across 
[Baghdad].”280 Historian Toby Dodge points out that this power vacuum accelerated the 
transition of looters into organized criminal organizations.281  
The United States created the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), an 
organization led by Lewis Paul Bremmer, to stabilize Iraq prior to holding national 
elections. The CPA’s governance of Iraq has been criticized in four different ways. First, 
the CPA helped form the Sunni insurgency through its policy of “de-Ba’athification” 
(CPA Order No. 1) and the disbanding of the Iraqi military (CPA Order No. 2).282 By 
May 2003, an estimated 750,000 Ba’athist were unemployed,283 of which 720,000 were 
former security personnel.284 Political scientist James Pfiffner argues that these two 
orders created the Sunni insurgency by alienating Sunni Iraqis, undermining the normal 
governing infrastructure, removing the security apparatus, and creating resentment 
toward the United States.285 Additionally, Salem Chalabi, a Shia exile, was appointed to 
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oversee the de-Ba’athification trial in Iraq.286 Salem’s appointment was highly criticized 
as creating an American run judiciary that was not impartial.287  
Second, the CPA also created an amicable environment for economic crisis 
corruption. The United Nations passed Security Council Resolution 1483 on April 12, 
2003, and it established the Development Fund for Iraq, approximately nine billion 
dollars to be spent under CPA authority.288 Sociologist David Whyte asserts that the CPA 
spent Iraqi funds in a cavalier way with little oversight on the contracts leading to “at 
least $8.8 billion…unaccounted for.”289 For example, Stuart W. Bowen, a presidentially 
appointed special inspector general, found “that $1.2 billion to $1.6 billion had been 
stolen and moved to a bunker in rural Lebanon for safe keeping.”290 
Third, CPA contracting procedures also created a patronage network for U.S. 
contractors. In May 2003, U.S. Congress passed an emergency supplemental funds 
appropriation for $2.5 billion allocated for reconstruction in Iraq, in addition to U.S. 
Agency for International Development’s $500 million in assistance;291 further funds were 
allocated by other U.S. Government agencies, totaling $30 billion.292 The CPA 
requirements for awarding U.S. contracts was stringently regulated, requiring forms be 
filled out in English, use of the correct terminology, and an intimate knowledge of U.S. 
Federal Acquisitions regulations.293 These requirements imposed restrictions only U.S. 
contractors could pass, leading to a surge in U.S. contractor partnership and hiring. 
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Whyte goes so far as to argue that the CPA exchanged Saddam’s tribal nepotism with 
capitalist patronage.294 
Finally, the CPA constructed a system that was unable to monitor itself or 
prosecute corruption. Prior to the invasion of Iraq, the Board of Supreme Audit, an Iraqi 
organization mandated with detecting “corruption, fraud, waste, abuse and inefficiency,” 
was considered very effective, and had direct access to prosecutorial judges in the case 
corruption was found.295 With the CPA de-Ba’athification order, the Board of Supreme 
Audit was disbanded. In April 2004, CPA Order No. 77 reinstated the Board, but 
subordinated it to the CPA instituted Ministry Inspector Generals.296 Effectively, the 
decision to prosecute corruption was given to the head of each ministry. Zaid al-Ali, a 
legal advisor for the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq, states that “A 
bureaucratic nightmare had been created just when violence and corruption were on the 
rise and when there was a desperate need for legal clarity to allow existing institutions to 
function effectively.”297 
Despite initial setbacks, the CPA handed over authority to an interim government 
in June of 2004. The transition left Iraq with reduced oversight of the fledgling 
government. Under these conditions, heads of the ministries were able achieve significant 
crisis corruption. In October 2006, the interim Minister of Electricity, Ayham al-
Samaraie, was sentenced to two years in prison in connection to the disappearance of $2 
billion allocated for Iraqi electrical infrastructure.298 The interim Minister of Defense, 
Hazem Sha’alan, reinstituted the same networks utilized by Saddam era oil-for-food 
smugglers and was able to steal between $1.3 to $2.3 billion.299 The interim Minister of 
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the Interior, Falah Hassan al-Naqib, spent $4.2 million on VIP trailers and an Olympic-
size pool from allocated funds for a police training camp.300 Ministers also created “shell 
companies” outside Iraq that would bid on reconstruction contracts with no intent to 
fulfill their requirement.301 These same practices were executed in 2008, when the 
Minister of Defense bought $75 million worth of the ADE 651, a fake bomb detector, 
from James McCormick, owner of Advanced Tactical Security & Communications; this 
fictitious product was used by Iraqi security forces until 2013.302  
The United States formed its first patronage network in August 2004. The newly 
returned Shiite exile, Muqtada al Sadr, began preaching extreme rhetoric to his loyalists, 
often called “Sadrists,” prior to the handover of authority to the interim government in an 
attempt to gain political influence.303 The Sadrists began to revolt in key towns across 
southern Iraq,304 most notably in Najaf in August 2004, where Sadr established his 
headquarters in the Imam Ali Mosque.305 At the end of August, General George W. 
Casey, Jr., the commanding general of Multi-National Forces-Iraq, negotiated a ceasefire 
with Sadr in which “Casey spent $1.2 million buying back some weapons and $330 
million more in what were called ‘reconstruction funds.’”306 The patronage network 
formed by the United States decreased the risk from Shia threat groups, and would last 
until the Samarra Mosque was bombed in 2006, sparking massive sectarian violence.  
The 2005 elections added to sectarian tensions because the Shia majority gained 
control of the Iraqi political system. The Sunni minority protested the 2005 parliamentary 
elections for two reasons. First, the Sunni were still angry about 2004 combat operations 
in Fallujah, initiated by the death and mutilation of four U.S. contract workers, which had 
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destroyed the city.307 Second, political scientist Adeed Dawisha and political sociologist 
Larry Diamond asserted, of the Sunni: “Fearful of losing political power, they tried to 
thwart and delegitimize the elections, publicly boycotting and belittling them as a U.S. 
imperialist endeavor, while giving a silent nod to the threat and intimidation employed by 
the Sunni insurgents.”308 The boycott resulted in the Sunnis obtaining only 17 out of 275 
seats in the Transitional National Assembly.309 Although the Sunnis boycotted the 
election, the coalition was able to negotiate their inclusion in drafting the Iraqi 
constitution, ensuring the constitution passed in August 2005, even if by a small 
margin.310 Finally, Nouri al-Maliki, a Shia exile, won the Prime Minister office during 
the December 2005 elections with a platform of a more inclusive government.311  
Sunni exclusion from the Iraqi political process spurred an increase in violence 
from 2005 to 2007. U.S. Army Colonel William Hix, the chief strategist of the Multi-
National Task Force-Iraq under General Casey, assessed that insurgents, comprised 
predominately of Sunni tribes, escalated attacks in 2005 in an effort to “undermine the 
political process and the legitimacy of the new government.”312 The attacks targeted 
members of the populace, both Sunni and Shia, government officials, and members of the 
Iraqi and coalition security forces.  
Sectarian violence and the insurgency became a front for market corruption. For 
example, the Jaish-al-Mahdi, Sadr’s Shia militia, sold stolen homes and cars for profit 
while Sunni insurgents used extortion, kidnapping and oil smuggling to fund their cause; 
both extorted protection money from reconstruction contractors.313 
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Missteps by the organization Al-Qaeda in Iraq empowered the United States to 
form a second patronage network. In 2006, the coalition initiated a new “surge strategy,” 
increasing U.S. forces in Iraq by 30,000, in an attempt to quell increasing insurgent and 
sectarian violence. Foreign policy analyst Phil Williams explains that a rift between 
Sunni tribes and Al-Qaeda emerged over disputes about smuggling and black market 
activities.314 General David Petraeus was able to capitalize on the rift, and eventually 
paid $400 million to Sunni tribes that later formed the “Sons of Iraq,” a Sunni 
paramilitary group that split from Al-Qaeda and succeeded in driving the insurgent group 
from the central portion of Iraq.315  
Insurgent and sectarian violence in Iraq began to subside in the fall of 2007, and 
stability was within reach. The formation of the patronage network enabled the coalition 
to provide the necessary security required for the formation of a working government. In 
2008, President Bush made an agreement with Prime Minister Maliki for U.S. forces to 
remain in Iraq until 2011. On December 18, 2011, U.S. forces withdrew from Iraq in 
accordance with the agreement.316 
After the U.S. withdrawal, the corruption established during the war continued, 
eventually leading to instability. After Maliki’s election in 2006 and again in 2010, the 
Shia used his position of authority to “ensure Shia majority in all ministries,” to 
marginalize Sunnis within the government, and to “consolidate Shia power in 
Baghdad.”317 Maliki also made use of the U.S. created de-Ba’athification laws to target 
political opponents and remove their eligibility for office.318 General Petraeus states that 
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this patronage corruption “started the process of undoing the process that we’d worked so 
hard to do during the surge and even in the years after the surge.”319 
Security forces were also rife with corruption and continued to deteriorate after 
the U.S. withdrawal in 2011. Nepotism was a leading cause of the Iraq security force 
failure in 2014 against the advance of the Islamic State in Syria and the Levant (ISIL). 
Prior to their advance, Maliki had replaced trained commanders with political loyalists, 
thus rendering the military weak and ineffective.320 In fact, this process of undermining 
the officers’ corps began while U.S. and coalition forces were still in the country. As 
early as 2007, U.S. Army First Sergeant Joseph McFarlane stated that, “Most of [the Iraqi 
Army’s] promotion system has been based on nepotism or family.”321 The Iraqi Police 
Service was also based on nepotism and rather than relying on an independent process 
used sheikhs to verify if a candidate was associated with insurgents.322 Al-Ali states that 
“there was very little desire to take risks on behalf of political elites who were viewed as 
wildly corrupt.”323 Similar to the Saddam era, the Iraqi military was commanded by 
officers with little to no military experience.  
Market corruption was also problematic in the Iraqi security forces. Williams 
states that by 2006, “it was estimated that more than 14,000 of the 370,000 weapons the 
United States provided to Iraq in the previous few years were unaccounted for,” adding 
that similar weapons were available in Iraqi markets.324 Additionally, in 2014, Iraqi 
Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi accused military commanders of skimming the pay of 
50,000 “ghost” soldiers who were on record but did not actually exist.325 Global Security 
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explains that “They do this by firing soldiers and not taking them off the payroll, splitting 
salaries, pocketing half and giving the rest to men who do not show up to work, and even 
listing soldiers who have defected or been killed.”326 Atheel al-Nujaifi, the former mayor 
of Mosul, accused Iraqi military officers in his city of being complicit with Islamic State 
smuggling operations that contributed to ISIL’s control of Mosul prior to their assault in 
2014.327 The Islamic State recruited the willing, intimidated those that interfered, and 
killed the rest.328 Several Iraqi soldiers assert they were ordered to abandon their posts 
prior to the assault, substantiating allegations of corruption within Iraqi security forces. 
Ultimately, the Iraqi military all but collapsed with the arrival of the ISIL in June of 
2014, forcing the Maliki-led government to resign and a new unity government to be 
created.329  
The U.S.-led occupation of Iraq created the conditions for several forms of 
corruption. Some of these forms had short-term stabilizing effects, but over the duration, 
they led to the collapse of the military and government. The CPA de-Ba’athification 
policy and disbanding the Iraqi military provided the required personnel and motive for 
an insurgency, demonstrating that policies that exclude key members of society are 
bound to negatively affect stability. This decision not only negatively affected the near-
term stability of Iraq, but it also had lasting repercussions. For example, Liz Sly, a 
Washington Post reporter, writes that Iraqi security officers affected by the de-
Ba’athification policy are currently aiding the Islamic State’s assault and occupation of 
Iraq.330  
Crisis corruption in the form of graft and misuse of reconstruction funds reduced 
the effectiveness of international efforts to stabilize the country, raised the cost for SO, 
funded part of the insurgency, and delegitimized the new Iraqi government. The 
                                                 
326 Global Security, “Iraqi Army,” Global Security, 2015, http://www.globalsecurity.org. 
327 Al-Monitor, “Former Mosul Mayor Says Corruption Led to ISIS Takeover,” Al-Monitor, July 2, 
2014, http://www.al-monitor.com. 
328 Al-Ali, “How Maliki Ruined Iraq.” 
329 Ibid.; Global Security, “Iraqi Army.” 
330 Liz Sly, “The Hidden Hand Behind the Islamic State Militants? Saddam Hussein’s,” Washington 
Post, April 4, 2015, http://www.washingtonpost.com. 
 80 
embezzlement of reconstruction funds resulted in faulty electrical and other infrastructure 
throughout Iraq. Embezzled funds also created a poorly armed and outdated military, 
which can also be blamed for the loss of countless lives through the purchase of faulty or 
fake security equipment. 
The U.S. sponsored patronage networks with the Shia in 2004 and Sunni in 2007 
momentarily added to the stability of Iraq. Buying momentary peace in 2004, the U.S. 
military was able to focus security efforts on Al-Qaeda in Iraq and then later separate the 
“irreconcilable” members of the insurgency that could not be integrated back into society. 
The United States created patronage networks also capitalized on the close-knit tribal 
culture for both influence and information. Lastly, the patronage network motivated the 
Sons of Iraq to secure their territory from insurgents. However, these patronage networks, 
while stabilizing in the short run, proved to be highly destabilizing over time.  
Finally, similar to the Saddam era military prior to the Iran-Iraq war, Shia 
nepotism within Iraqi security forces decreased their effectiveness to the point that a 
fraction of Islamic State personnel were able to overrun Iraqi Army divisions. The Maliki 
administration installed incompetent military commanders who reduced the military’s 
planning and tactical capability, leaving Iraq vulnerable to invasion. Appointed military 
commanders used their positions for profit rather than to increase security by 
appropriating the pay of 50,000 ghost soldiers along with the sale of military weapons 
and supplies. 
D. CONCLUSION  
A waterfall effect of corruption added to the current situation in Iraq. The British 
patronage network of the Sunni, although stabilizing at the time, set precedence for the 
future rule of Iraq along with creating Shia grievances. The patronage network was then 
exploited by the Ba’athist regime to create a nepotistic network to ensure their control of 
the government. The nepotistic network, which constituted approximately 60 percent of 
the Iraqi populace, may have added to the formation of the insurgency once the Saddam 
regime was toppled. Additionally, the Ba’athists created the framework for market 
corruption through the illicit sale of oil under UN sanctions. During the coalition 
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occupation, the reinvigoration of the Ba’athist market corruption networks by members 
of the ministries empowered the skimming of a substantial amount of reconstruction 
funds, thereby delegitimizing the new government. The empowerment of a Shia 
patronage network within the state and a diminishing Sunni voice created a volatile 
environment ready for an insurgency undermining both the stability and legitimacy of 
Iraq. 
The next chapter reviews the definitions for “stability” and “corruption.” Also, by 
comparing the Afghanistan and Iraq case studies, this thesis concludes that Johnston’s 
different forms of corruption are more prevalent at different times during SO. For 
example, crisis corruption is extensive and destabilizing at the start of SO, whereas 
patronage and market forms of corruption can initially aid in stabilization. Furthermore, 
the different forms of corruption morph throughout SO, necessitating a change in priority 
for the military’s anti-corruption efforts. The next chapter will conclude with 
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V. CONCLUSION 
A. SUMMARY FINDINGS 
This thesis began by creating working definitions of stability and corruption, 
drawn from academic and practitioners’ literature. Specifically, this thesis used Chalmers 
Johnson’s concept of homeostatic equilibrium to define stability: a condition in which the 
state’s populace, government, and social structure are in balance or synchronization with 
respect to its environment. The intervals between equilibrated periods constitute varying 
degrees of instability. This thesis used Johnson’s understanding of equilibrium and 
disequilibrium specifically to investigate the effects of corruption on governments and 
societies within states.  
This thesis also drew from a variety of literature to create a working definition of 
corruption. Specifically, it used Aled Williams’ definition of corruption—the instance 
where societal norms about fairness, equity, reasonableness, and the allocation of 
responsibilities, are considered to have been abused. Within this definition, the thesis 
made several assertions regarding the study of corruption and its effects on stability: first, 
corruption is prevalent in all societies, but culture and context make it a relative term; in 
other words, there is no “one-size-fits-all” regarding corruption and its effects in practice. 
Second, corruption is more than just financial. As importantly, there are non-material 
forms of corruption that require investigation for their roles in affecting the stability of a 
state. Specifically, this thesis identified four types, drawn from political scientist Michael 
Johnston: crisis (the corruption that occurs during radical shifts in governance and 
politics), nepotism (favoring relatives or close friends, usually within government 
positions), patronage (the allocation of money or influence to supporters), and market 
(the illicit sale of products or services that bypass normal means of conveyance).  
Although Johnston hypothesizes that market and patronage forms of corruption 
are generally more stabilizing, while nepotism and crisis corruption are more 
destabilizing, cultural tolerance of corruption truly determines the stabilizing or 
destabilizing nature of each form, as illustrated in the case studies. This observation 
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makes studying corruption particularly challenging because a society’s culture is 
constantly changing. Therefore, it is important to study the effects of corruption on 
stability over time, not just in the beginning of a crisis or towards its end.  
The case studies for this thesis focused on the most recent U.S. interventions in 
Afghanistan (2001–2015) and Iraq (2003–2011). In both cases, U.S. and host nation 
officials noted corruption as a significant impediment to the creation of a stable state. 
Additionally, both cases involved a large deployment of the U.S. military to conduct SO 
after major conflict operations ceased.  
The Afghanistan case study examined three broad time periods covering almost 
two centuries. The first period covered Dost Mohammad Khan Shah’s reign in 1826 and 
ended with the assassination of Mohammad Nadir Khan Shah in 1933, which included 
the Anglo-Afghan wars of the 19th century. The ruling elite created short-term stability 
by consolidating their power through culturally acceptable patronage and nepotistic 
networks. The British exploited the Afghan patronage networks by infusing them with 
aid and other forms of influence, eventually breaking the necessary trust of the tribal 
leaders within the network, resulting in the long-term destabilization of the state.  
Starting in 1933, Mohammad Zahir Khan Shah’s monarchy introduced market 
corruption by attempting to consolidate and modernize Afghanistan’s military, an effort 
which initiated the destabilization of his regime. The state also exacerbated market 
corruption after attempting to curtail bribes within the civil service. Simultaneously, the 
Afghans grew increasingly dependent on patronage and nepotistic relationships to create 
stability after the Soviet withdrawal; an initial three year civil war among rival 
Mujahedeen groups removed Afghan President Mohammad Najibullah from power in 
1992.  
The rise of the Taliban in 1992 initiated the third cycle of destabilization and 
corruption. The Taliban created new patronage networks through its strict interpretation 
of Islam and through Pashtun lineage. The United States deposed the Taliban in 2001 
only to perpetuate similar forms of corruption in the years that followed. The United 
States instituted patronage networks that provided momentary stability, but stifled 
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competition and was, therefore, destabilizing over time. Crisis and market forms of 
corruption flourished out of these patron-client relationships, exacerbated by the 
continual flow of financial aid into an unstable environment. 
The Iraq case study considered three time periods beginning with the British 
Mandate of Iraq (1920 to 1932), followed by Ba’athist rule (1968 to 2003), and 
concluded with the U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq (2003 to 2011). This 
investigation found that the British established Sunni patronage networks that 
momentarily stabilized Iraq from 1920 to 1932. However, Britain also perpetuated crisis 
corruption to extract natural resources creating extensive instability by disenfranchising 
the populace. King Faisal I transmuted the patronage network into a nepotistic network to 
help solidify his reign. By initiating patronage corruption, the British enabled subsequent 
regimes to exploit the patronage and nepotistic networks. Ultimately, these forms of 
corruption resulted in increased instability, both within the state and social structure.  
The Ba’athist regime, 1968 to 2003, expanded upon the corruption established by 
the British. The Ba’athists used crisis corruption after their coup in the form of 
governmental purges to expand the patronage and nepotistic networks within the Iraqi 
government, generating stability from authoritarian control. During the Iran-Iraq war, the 
nepotistic network of political appointees within the military resulted in an incompetent 
officer corps. The use of market corruption, specifically during the UN sanctions in the 
1990s, increased regime stability through the accumulation of revenue, which in turn was 
used to further control the populace. 
The U.S. occupation of Iraq created instability through the Coalition Provisional 
Authority orders of de-Ba’athification and disbanding the Iraqi military, disrupting the 
Ba’athist nepotistic and patronage networks. Crisis corruption was rampant, especially in 
contracting; likewise, Iraqi ministries spent large sums of money with little oversight. 
Patronage networks within the Iraqi military contributed to its collapse with the advance 
of ISIL in 2014, as did Shia patronage and nepotistic networks within the Iraqi 
government.  
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B. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS ABOUT CORRUPTION AND STABILITY 
This thesis gathered several general observations about the nature of corruption 
and its impact on stability. First, as shown in Chapters III and IV, corruption is generally 
cyclical in nature. Regimes typically use patronage and nepotistic forms of corruption to 
consolidate power over fragmented and unstable territories. While stabilizing in the short 
run, these policies ultimately lead to the collapse of regimes and the beginning of a new 
cycle. This thesis identified that virtually all of the time periods studied in Afghanistan 
involved leaders or intervening powers using patronage and nepotistic networks to 
establish or consolidate authority. However, over time these forms of corruption proved 
destabilizing to leadership.  
Second, once a state’s regime or an intervening power uses a form of corruption 
to establish stability, subsequent regimes generally continue to use and magnify that form 
of corruption. For example, from 1826 to 1842 and again from 1845 to 1863, Dost 
Mohammad Khan twice consolidated his control over Afghanistan by establishing a 
nepotistic monarchy of appointed family members to every official position throughout 
the state. Similarly, in 1973, Mohammad Daoud Khan consolidated his power through 
nepotistic networks, abolished the monarchy, and promoted himself to de facto president 
and prime minister. In Iraq, Saddam Hussein embezzled a reported $900 million annually 
from the oil for food program, money intended for a suffering population. Somewhat 
similarly, following the overthrow of Saddam’s regime, the new Iraqi Minister of 
Defense, Hazam Sha’alan, embezzled $1.3 to $2.3 billion. This ever-increasing pattern of 
corruption over time suggests that, once started, a culture of corruption allows it to 
persist, making fighting these forms of corruption more difficult.  
A third observation is that short-term pay offs in corruption often have long-term 
consequences. In both Afghanistan and Iraq, several instances of corruption showed 
stabilizing effects in the short run, but later became destabilizing. For example, in both 
cases, market corruption was initially useful for the survival of the populace because of 
the governments’ inability to provide basic necessities and services; nonetheless, market 
corruption later became destabilizing as it undercut the government’s control and ability 
to collect revenue, particularly taxes.  
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Similarly, patronage and nepotistic forms of corruption initially built loyalty and 
trust within a regime by relying on family members and key individuals to keep the 
country running. However, the long-term effect was that large segments of the population 
were excluded from these positions and animosity grew between the rulers and the rest of 
society. This dynamic was particularly evident in the Iraqi military, where nepotism 
ensured loyalty between the officers’ corps and the regime, but to the detriment of the 
military’s effectiveness and its perceived trustworthiness amongst the populous.  
Finally, the sole outlier for the tradeoff between short- and long-term effects of 
corruption on stability was crisis corruption; crisis corruption never appeared to be 
stabilizing during this research. The British perpetuated crisis corruption by exploiting 
Iraqi natural resources, which created an environment of near slave labor and famine 
prior to the Revolution of 1920. More recently, crisis corruption occurred in both 
Afghanistan and Iraq during reconstruction efforts, increasing the costs and the 
grievances within the populace.  
Furthermore, economists have studied the relationship between foreign aid and 
stability. Economist Paul Collier expresses that instability persists within a state with low 
income, slow economic growth, and a dependence on natural resources.331 Economists 
Simeon Djankov, Jose G. Montalvo, and Marta Reynal-Querol counter that the infusion 
of foreign aid undermines stability more than a country’s overreliance on natural 
resources.332 Both case studies in this thesis demonstrate that foreign aid became a 
catalyst for corruption and instability, specifically for crisis and market corruption. 
International aid was destabilizing because not only were political and economic systems 
too weak to account for the aid, resulting in capital flight, but it delegitimized the 
government. In Iraq, the infusion of $9 billion dollars resulted in the loss of $8.8 billion; 
in Afghanistan, the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction claims that 
a significant amount of aid disappeared, most likely into bank accounts of government 
officials.  
                                                 
331 Paul Collier, The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries Are Failing and What Can Be Done 
about It (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 19–21. 
332 Simeon Djankov, Jose G. Montalvo, and Marta Reynal-Querol, “The Curse of Aid,” Journal of 
Economic Growth 13, no. 3 (2008): 169–194. 
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C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
This thesis proposes a rank order of the different forms of corruption based on the 
frequency and negative outcomes to deal with corruption during SO. Because corruption 
has the potential to change over time, this thesis split SO into three subjective phases to 
provide the most flexible model without detracting from its usefulness.  
 
Figure 4.  Predominant Forms of Corruption Throughout Stability Operations 
At the beginning of SO, anti-corruption efforts should focus on the crisis and 
nepotistic forms of corruption. The military should prioritize efforts against crisis 
corruption because it is the most rampant form of corruption especially after conflict 
operations or natural disasters. Nepotism is not necessarily common during this phase, 
but the ramifications of allowing a nepotistic network to form during the early phases, 
significantly undermines stability during the subsequent phases. Patronage networks may 
actually be stabilizing during the initial phase because they form a power base between 
the government and the populace adding to state legitimacy. If the U.S. military allows 
patronage, the military must monitor it because patronage can easily transform into a 
 89 
nepotistic network. Market forms of corruption during the beginning of SO are almost a 
necessity because they provide the necessities the government cannot provide on its own. 
In this sense, the populace uses market corruption to ensure their survival. 
In the middle of SO, anti-corruption efforts should focus on the nepotistic and 
patronage forms of corruption. Nepotism becomes increasingly destabilizing during the 
middle phase of SO because it significantly empowers a small portion of the populace, a 
family or tribe, creating a fissure between the government and populace. Nepotistic 
networks may also spread throughout the government, producing incompetent ministers 
and military officers. Patronage is similar; however, the fissure is not as severe because a 
wider portion of the populace is empowered. During this phase, it is difficult to 
differentiate market and crisis corruption. The destabilizing effects of market corruption 
begin to appear, but are not as substantial as nepotism and patronage. The combination of 
crisis corruption with market corruption seems to lead to destabilizing market corruption 
at the end of SO. 
Toward the conclusion of SO, anti-corruption efforts should focus on market and 
patronage corruption. Market corruption becomes the antithesis of state legitimacy and 
stability. Market corruption becomes an avenue through which adversarial groups can 
infiltrate a state, in addition to undermining legitimate industry and tax collection. 
Patronage corruption creates partisan views between the empowered and ruled segments 
of a state creating instability, especially when there is no method to vent grievances. 
Nepotism might become more stabilizing during the latter phases of SO because it 
solidifies state control. Finally, unless internal turmoil continues, crisis corruption 
becomes almost non-existent. 
Separately, the U.S. military should incorporate with DOS anti-corruption efforts 
because DOS has oversight on all U.S. government anti-corruption efforts. This may 
streamline U.S. efforts, prevent redundancy, and create unity of effort. For example, prior 
to military SO, the DOD, with the United States Agency for International Development, 
should harmonize on incorporating foreign aid while mitigating crisis and market 
corruption, especially when transitioning from major conflict. Integration should continue 
during SO as the nature and prevalence of the different forms of corruption change. 
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Agreed upon mutual goals are important because, as stated in Chapter II, military 
commanders may be the sole U.S. representatives in a geographic area. 
D. RECOMMENDED FUTURE RESEARCH 
This thesis’ aim was to provide examples and recommendations at the tactical and 
operational levels for dealing with corruption. This thesis observed that examples of 
corruption were generally at the operational or strategic levels. Additional research 
should focus on interviewing military personnel for their experiences with corruption, 
with the projected compilation of “best practices” for the military. Future research might 
focus on creating a corruption tracking system for the military to reduce the friction 
during anti-corruption efforts. The tracking system might track individuals and groups 
involved in the different forms of corruption. The distribution of this information may 
increase the continuity between units and U.S. government organizations.  
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